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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
CEO HUMILITY: DEVELOPMENT OF AN UNOBSTRUSIVE MEASURE AND
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
by
Marie-Michèle Beauchesne
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, FL
Professor Nathan Hiller, Major Professor
Over the past 30 years, the Upper Echelons perspective of strategic management
has sought to explain a given organization’s strategies and effectiveness as a reflection of
the differences in personality, background, and other characteristics of the senior
executives that guides each organization. An important stream of research within this
field has linked a firm’s strategy to the grandiose way that executives are often thought to
view themselves – namely through examining the narcissism, core self-evaluations
(CSE), and hubris of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs).
In this dissertation, I focus on understanding the strategic impact of CEO humility
– a trait that has often been erroneously thought of to represent a poor view of oneself.
Consistent with ancient writings and recent research, humility is defined herein as a
multi-faceted trait that is the common core of four dimensions: self-awareness,
developmental orientation/teachability, appreciation of others' strengths and
contributions, and low self-focus.
In the first essay, I explore the conceptual relevance and various potential
implications of executive humility. Drawing on existing empirical research about the
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humility construct and general behavioral implications of humility, I argue that executive
humility is a critical avenue toward a more rich and nuanced understanding of the
delicate interplay and implications of executive self-concept.
In essay two, I develop and validate an unobtrusive measure of CEO humility.
Ten indicators of humility are suggested and then validated using a self-reported survey
administered to a sample of 30 U.S. and Canadian CEOs. Two behaviors were found to
be significantly positively related to self-reported humility: CEOs who volunteered some
of their time for non-profit organizations and CEO’s who reported that part of their own
firm’s success was due to the help of the board of directors.
In essay three, I examine the relationship between the level of CEO humility and
four firm-level outcomes. Employing a sample of 163 CEOs appointed to S&P 500 firms
between 2005-2008, I show that firms led by humble CEOs (measured by the unobtrusive
indicators) tend to outperform others in regards to corporate social performance, while at
the same time showing that their financial performance is generally no better or worse.
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I. Leader Humility in the Executive Context
Abstract
This first study explores the relevance and potential implications of humility in the
executive context. Building on leader humility research at the non-executive level (and
more general research on the construct of humility), several avenues are proposed to
integrate humility as an important self-concept variable to examine at the CEO-level. It is
argued that the inclusion of humility in the Upper Echelons literature will broaden the
discussion on the strategic implications of executive self-concept beyond the traditional
dimensions of narcissism, hubris and CSE to provide a more rich and nuanced
understanding of the delicate interplay and implications of executive self-concept.

Introduction
How “should” executives think of themselves? In the last fifteen years, there has
been growing research interest in the fields of strategic management and leadership in the
constructs and implications of executive self-concept spurred in part by corporate
scandals, malfeasance, and tales of executive excess. This research has focused largely on
what might be considered the “high” end of self-concept personality dimensions –
narcissism, hubris, overconfidence and core self-evaluations (CSE) (e.g., Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Li & Tang, 2010; Resick, Whitman,
Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009). There is growing evidence that those CEO self-concept
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personality traits are predictive of a host of firm-level outcomes such as strategic
dynamism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), different measures of team performance
(Resick et al., 2009), and premiums paid for acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).
Notwithstanding the value of studying CEOs who think extremely highly of themselves, I
argue here that focusing exclusively on those "high" end self-concept personality
dimensions may give us an incomplete picture of the strategic implications of CEO selfview.
In order to get a more refined understanding of the impact that CEO self-view has
on organizational outcomes, I suggest the study of CEO humility as an important path
forward. The study of humility and its interplay with leadership is gaining momentum in
both the fields of management and psychology (Ou et al., 2014; Owens, Johnson, &
Mitchell, 2013). Historically considered to be an important virtue by theologists and
philosophers (Morris, Brotheridge, & Urbanski, 2005), humility has recently been
suggested to be an important pillar of several positive theories of leadership such as
servant leadership, ethical leadership, spiritual leadership and authentic leadership (e.g.,
Avolio, Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009; Barbuto & Wheeler, 2006; Brown & Trevino, 2006;
van Dierendonck &Nuijten, 2011). These theories all emphasize the importance of
having leaders who display humility, self-awareness and integrity. Humility, in addition
to the growing interest in the field of leadership, has also become a prominent topic in
personality studies. The work of Lee and Ashton (2004, 2005, 2006, 2008) that proposes
the inclusion of humility as the sixth dimension of the Big 5 (i.e., honesty-humility
dimension) has gained growing acceptance among personality researchers.
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Despite the growing evidence of the relevance of the construct of humility as a
gateway to understanding individual work performance, social relationships, and
importantly, leadership, very few studies have examined humility in the field of strategic
management. Jim Collins, in his best-seller Good to Great (2001), popularized the idea
that not all successful CEOs are highly visible, extraverted individuals, and showed that
some of the most successful organizations were in fact led by humble CEOs with strong
professional will. He brought attention to the idea that effective leadership is not all about
grandiosity and self-confidence, and that humility is an important piece of that puzzle.
Notwithstanding the methodological issues for which this book has been criticized,
Collins work has sparked interest in studying humility as an important characteristic for
CEOs to possess. More recently, Ou and colleagues (2014) have studied CEO humility
(using a Chinese sample) linking it to several top management team (TMT) processes
(e.g., TMT integration) and employee-level outcomes (e.g., middle managers' work
engagement, affective commitment, and job performance). While CEO humility has been
found to be related to positive employee-level outcomes, we have yet to uncover the
strategic implications they have on the firms they lead.
In this first essay, I 1) define humility 2) discuss how it differs from other traits in
its nomological network 3) examine the correlates of humility 4) discuss how humility is
important to broaden our understanding of the strategic implications of CEOs views of
self, and 5) offer two avenues for future research on CEO humility which will be further
examined in essays two and three.
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What is (not) humility?
Historically, the topic of humility has been studied extensively in both theology
and philosophy. Since humility often involves an appreciation of knowledge and
guidance beyond the self, it is an important virtue in several religions including
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, etc. (Owens, 2009). In philosophy, humility is
characterized as a temperance virtue – a virtue that guards against excess (Park &
Peterson, 2003). Considering the abundant work on humility pertaining to the
philosophical, theological, and psychological perspectives, there has yet to be an agreed
upon set of dimensions although many differing conceptualizations have emerged over
time (Ou, 2011; Owens, 2009).
Definitions of humility usually fall into two broad categories: humility as a sign
of an individual perceiving oneself to have little worth, or, humility as being centrally
about a fair self-evaluation (neither too positive nor too negative) and associated with
adaptiveness, growth, and prosocial patterns (Owens, 2009). Early writings and
colloquial definitions of humility have mainly fallen into the first category, contributing
to a pervasive misconception that humility is, in essence, a weakness – summed up by the
phrase “I am not worth it” (Weiss & Knight, 1980). While lay definitions of humility
often include low self-regard and unworthiness, Tangney's (2001) review of literature on
humility demonstrated that most of the work published in theology, philosophy, and
psychology has portrayed humility as a positive characteristic and humble individuals are
described as having a stable sense of self-worth and self-respect (Owens, Rowatt, &
Wilkins, 2011; Vera & Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004).
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Using this virtuous conceptualization, scholars have proposed anywhere from
three to thirteen dimensions of the broad construct of humility (Vera and RodriguezLopez, 2004; Owens et al., 2013). Owens and colleagues (2013) argued that the differing
definitions of humility stand partly from the fact that some have a more intrapersonal and
internal focus (e.g., balanced processing of personal strengths and weaknesses), whereas
others capture the manifested, external, expressed dimensions of humility (e.g., seek to
learn from others and listen to advice). In addition, while some scholars have
operationalized humility as a trait (e.g., Hackett & Wang, 2012; Morris et al. 2005; Ou et
al. 2014), several leadership approaches (e.g., servant leadership, authentic leadership,
spiritual leadership) tend to treat it as a leadership component undifferentiated from
leader behaviors. In this essay, I focus on the psychological perspective that suggests
humility is a personal trait distinct from leadership behaviors. Whereas a systemic review
of all previous definitions of humility is beyond the scope of this section, I review herein
some of the most widely cited humility definitions, emphasizing both their similarities
and differences.
Lee and Ashton's work (2004, 2005, 2006, 2008) on the extension of the Big 5
Personality framework to include the dimension of honesty-humility has greatly
contributed to the study of humility. The added dimension is argued to comprise four
facets: sincerity, fairness, greed avoidance and modesty. Derived from lexical studies of
personality structures, the honesty-humility factor was found to be strongly negatively
correlated with the Dark Triad personality traits – psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and
narcissism (with correlations ranging from -0.53 to -0.72) (Lee & Ashton, 2005). While
there is considerable overlap between the honesty-humility dimension of the HEXACO
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model and recent definitions of humility, in more traditional humility definitions the
facets of sincerity and fairness are not usually included.
Another widely cited definition is the one by Tangney (2002) who proposed that
the key components of humility are: an accurate self-assessment of abilities and
achievements, self-awareness of mistakes and limitations, openness to new ideas,
information and advice from others, capacity to keep successes and accomplishments in
perspective, low self-focus, and appreciation of others. Owens (2009) performed a
systematic review of the previous 10 years of humility literature from psychological and
organizational behavior journals which led him to a four-factor structure which
encompasses self-awareness, developmental orientation/teachability, appreciation of
others' strengths and contributions, and low self-focus. These four constituents are argued
to be the core features of humility and be closely interrelated.
More recently, Owens and colleagues (2013) suggested a definition of expressed
humility which included three broad categories of behaviors that underlie the construct –
manifested willingness to view oneself accurately, displayed appreciation of others, and
an openness to feedback/teachability. With a focus on the external aspects of humility,
the authors proposed that these three dimensions are the main behavioral manifestations
of humility. Arguing that humility definitions should include both the
cognitive/motivational and behavioral elements of the construct, Ou and colleagues
(2014) suggested a structure encompassing six dimensions adding – low self-focus, selftranscendent pursuit, and transcendent self-concept – to Owens and colleagues' threefactor structure. Although the terminology often varies among the different definitions,
the suggested dimensions usually overlap considerably. For example, while Ou and
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colleagues (2014) defined a self-transcendent pursuit as its own dimension of humility, it
is often included as a sub-facet of low self-focus (Owens, 2009).
While there is still not one definite accepted set of humility dimensions, there is a
growing consensus emerging among scholars on a general definition of humility which
describes humble individuals as self-aware of their strengths and limitations, open to
learn and seek advices from others, appreciative of others' strengths and contributions,
and not self-centered. In this essay humility is defined as a multi-faceted trait which is the
common core of the four dimensions of humility which appear most often in previous
conceptualizations (Owens, 2009): developmental orientation (i.e., teachability), selfawareness, appreciation of others, and low self-focus (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Qualitative Portrayal of the Conceptual Space Occupied by Humility

Dimensions of Humility
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1. Developmental Orientation/Teachability
“There is nothing noble in being superior to your fellow man; true nobility is being
superior to your former self.” - Ernest Hemingway
Humble individuals are characterized as having a developmental orientation.
They are receptive to new paradigms and eager to learn from others (Vera & RodriguezLopez, 2004). They have an open-mind, a willingness to seek advice and a desire to
constantly learn (Tangney, 2000). Aware of their weaknesses (captured by the selfawareness dimension of humility), humble individuals seek continual improvement,
which translates into an openness to new ideas, feedback, advice, and information
(Tangney, 2000). The developmental orientation, which characterizes humble
individuals, has critical implications for leadership (Owens, 2009). Alexander and Wilson
(1997) argued that having a desire and an openness to learn is one of the most important
capacities of effective leaders. Considering the new challenges of the current
"knowledge" economy and the ever rapid technological changes, organizations are more
than ever in need of leaders who have a capacity to absorb new information, learn from
others, and develop new skills (Owens et al., 2013). In addition, leaders who display
teachability provide a sense of voice to followers, which has been found to be related to
greater trust, motivation, and a sense of justice (Cropanzano et al., 2007).

2. Self-Awareness
"I am who I am; no more, no less.” - Terry Goodkind
The most commonly cited dimension of humility is self-awareness – the capacity
to evaluate your strengths and weaknesses without positive or negative exaggeration
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(Owens, Rowatt, & Wilkins, 2011). Humble individuals are characterized as having an
objective self-view, which entails both the capacity to accurately assess one's abilities and
successes and to acknowledge and take accountability for one’s mistakes, imperfections
and limited knowledge (Exline & Geyer, 2004; Tangney, 2002). As opposed to low selfesteem, which is associated with having a negative self-view, humility (and its dimension
of self-awareness) focuses on an accurate self-view and a non-defensive
acknowledgement of strengths and weaknesses (Exline & Geyer, 2004). The accurate
self-view, which characterizes humble leaders, makes them less prone to the
overconfidence that has often been associated with poor decision making and selfcomplacency (Owens et al., 2013; Vera & Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004). A balanced
awareness will also help leaders know when to take action versus learn more about an
issue, as well as surround themselves with complementary people, when they lack the
necessary expertise in a given situation (Owens, 2009). Self-awareness is also a key
component of authentic and servant leadership, which have been found to be predictive of
a host of positive outcomes such as organizational citizenship behaviors, organizational
commitment, satisfaction with supervisor and performance (see Avolio, Walumbwa, &
Weber, 2009 for a review). Practitioners also seem to recognize the importance for
leaders to have a balanced self-awareness, which explains the inclusion of personality
assessments and other self-awareness exercises, in leadership trainings.
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3. Appreciation of Others' Strengths and Contributions
“You need to be aware of what others are doing, applaud their efforts, acknowledge their
successes, and encourage them in their pursuits. When we all help one another,
everybody wins.” - Jim Stovall
Another facet of humility refers to the capacity to view others in an appreciative,
non-threatened way (Exline et al., 2004; Owens, 2009). Humility allows individuals to
value the work and contributions of others (Tangney, 2002) without eliciting feelings of
inferiority (Owens, 2009). It promotes an "other-enhancing" rather than a "selfenhancing" attitude (Morris et al., 2005). Humility may also enable an individual to
transcend the comparative-competitive model of self-evaluation – allowing that person to
view others' strengths and talents as opportunities to learn and grow instead of perceiving
them as threats (Owens, 2009). In the organizational context, humble leaders are more
likely to identify and value followers' unique talents (Owens et al., 2013). This facet of
humility has also been linked to the concept of inclusiveness – the extent to which the
leader is open to input and shows appreciation for the contributions of other individuals
(Nembhard & Emondson, 2006). Humble leaders openly rely on others (Weick, 2001),
treat them as equals (Whitener et al., 1998) and include them in the decision making
process (Morris et al., 2005; Owens & Hekman, 2012). Ou and colleagues (2014) found
empirical support for the proposition that humble leaders are more likely to include
subordinates in decision making, more specifically they found that humble CEOs engage
in more empowering leadership behaviors.
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4. Low Self-Focus
“True humility is not thinking less of yourself; it is thinking of yourself less.” - C.S. Lewis
CEO humility also encompasses a relatively low self-focus. As opposed to
narcissism, which reflects an intoxication and fixation with the self, humility involves
"forgetting the self" and recognizing that one is only a small piece of the larger universe
(Owens, 2009; Tangney, 2002). As such, humility has been found to be an important
virtue that encourages cooperative and prosocial behaviors in organizations (Exline &
Geyer, 2004; Owens, 2009). Humble leaders are seen as being less self-focused and more
engaged in self-transcendent pursuits (Ou et al., 2014). They are unlikely to seek undue
respect or benefits and do not need, nor want, to be the center of attention (Rowatt et al.,
2006). Understanding what leads individuals to transcend their self-interests and engage
in extra roles that benefit their organizations has been an important research topic among
management scholars (George and Brief, 1992; Podsakoff et al., 1993; Organ and Ryan,
1995), and humility has been argued to be a potential predictor of such prosocial type
behaviors in organizations (Exline, Geyer, 2004; Owens, 2009). Thus, this humility
dimension appears to have critical implications in the leadership context (particularly at
the top executive level) since organizations want leaders who will make decisions for the
good of the collective and not for self-interested motives (Owens, 2009).

Humility Nomological Network
As part of defining and understanding the construct of humility, it is important to
place humility within a nomological network of other existing traits related to self-views.
Understanding how humility fits into the broader individual's self-view arena is a critical
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task in moving humility research forward. The central question is whether humility
occupies the low end of narcissism or hubris constructs? Recent studies have found
preliminary evidence that humility is not just the low end of a narcissism, hubris, or CSE
construct continuum – it is distinct, both conceptually and empirically, from these other
traits (Ou et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2013). I review herein how humility differs from
three other self-view traits that have received considerable attention in the Upper
Echelons literature namely: narcissism, core self-evaluations, and hubris.
Humility versus Narcissism
Narcissistic individuals are characterized as having a strong self-focus, a feeling
of superiority and entitlement, and a constant need for attention and admiration (Bogart,
Benotsch, & Pavlovic, 2004; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). When comparing the
definition of narcissism with humility, we observe some conceptual overlap between
narcissism and the low self-focus dimension of humility. While humble individuals are
said to shy away from public attention and would rather not be the center of attention
(Rowatt et al., 2006), narcissistic individuals tend to do the opposite. However, as a
multifaceted trait, humility is much broader than anti-narcissism (i.e., the low end of
narcissism) – humility also captures the dimensions of openness to learn, appreciation of
others' strengths, and self –awareness, which are not included in the construct of
narcissism (Ou, 2011). In addition, while humility is associated with a stable self-view,
which does not overinflate with praise and success or deflate with criticism and failure,
narcissism refers to wide fluctuations from grandiose to negative self-views (Owens et
al., 2013). True narcissists are hypersensitive to criticism and have a fragile sense of self
(Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). On the other end, humble individuals are said to have a
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stable sense of self-worth and self-respect (Owens, Rowatt, & Wilkins, 2011; Vera &
Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004).
From an empirical standpoint, correlations found between narcissism and
humility have varied from -.07 (Ou, 2011) to -.63 (Owens et al., 2013). When humility
and narcissism were measured via both other-report and self-report surveys, correlations
tended to be higher when both constructs were measured using other-reports. For
example, Owens (2009) found a correlation of -.16 when both traits were measured with
self-reports and -.63 when measured with other-reports. Potentially, close others
overemphasize the behavioral manifestations of humility as compared to the more
internal components of humility (e.g., self-awareness). In other words, while humility and
anti-narcissism appear to be different conceptually, close others may use similar
behavioral markers to assess both the humble and narcissistic tendencies of the ratee. In
addition, correlations seem to vary depending on the nature of the sample. For example,
while Ou (2011) found a non-significant correlation between narcissism and humility (r=.08) when using a sample of MBA students, the correlation between the two same
variables was -.24 using a CEO sample. In sum, more empirical work is needed to further
examine the interplay between narcissism and humility. While the precise empirical
relationship between these constructs is not well understood, it certainly appears that in
any case they are not empirically identical. And certainly, from a conceptual standpoint,
while there is some overlap, there are also significant differences between narcissism and
humility. The observed fluctuations in the correlations found between narcissism and
humility appear to be driven, at least partly, by the nature of the sample, the approach to
measuring the constructs (i.e., other-reports versus self-reports), and the inclusion, or not,
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of the low self-focus dimension of humility, which overlaps considerably with antinarcissism.

Humility versus Core Self-Evaluations
Core self-evaluations (CSE) refer to the global assessment one makes about one's
own self-worth and capabilities (Chang, Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012; Judge,
Locke, Durham, & Kluger, 1998). Defined as the common core of self-esteem, selfefficacy, internal locus of control and emotional stability, high CSE individuals see
themselves as valuable, capable, agentic, and are less prone to anxiety (Hiller &
Beauchesne, 2014). When comparing the construct of humility with core self-evaluations,
an important distinction is how humility is associated with having an accurate self-view,
as opposed to CSE which suggests an optimistic (i.e., positive) self-view (Owens et al.,
2013). While this distinction is crucial, humility and CSE also share some commonalities.
For example, by taking personal accountability for mistakes and failures, humble leaders
display an internal locus of control, which is a key component of CSE (Ou, 2011).
Humble individuals also believe they can learn and improve their personal weaknesses
which gives them a sense of control over their destiny (Owens et al., 2013). Similarly,
individuals with an internal locus of control believe life is within their control and will
not blame chance, fate or outside events (Rotter, 1966).
Empirically, scholars have argued that the two constructs should be weakly
positively related (Ou, 2011). Owens and colleagues (2013) found humility and CSE to
be unrelated, whereas Ou (2011) found the two constructs to have a weak positive
relationship (r=.16 for other-report measure and r=.25 for self-report measure). Overall, it
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appears that the two multi-faceted constructs are different both conceptually and
empirically.

Humility versus Hubris
Hubris, another self-view variable that has received considerable attention in the
Upper Echelons literature (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Li & Tang, 2010), is
generally defined as an "exaggerated self-confidence". Unlike narcissism and core selfevaluations, hubris is not a well-validated psychological construct (Hiller & Hambrick,
2005). Scholars have used different proxies to capture CEO hubris such as the propensity
to overpay during corporate takeovers, recent media praise, and the difference between an
objective measure of performance and the CEOs subjective measure of performance (e.g.,
Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Li & Tang, 2010). The use of such varied and nonvalidated proxies makes it difficult to compare hubris to other traits.
Hubris is said to refer to an exaggerated belief, which diverges from objective
standards, about one's own judgement (Hayward & Hambrick,1997; Hiller & Hambrick,
2005; Li & Tang, 2010). Conversely, humble individuals are characterized as having an
accurate self-view and demonstrating a willingness to learn and listen to others' advice
(Morris et al., 2005). Thus, when making decisions they will value the opinions of others
and will not exclusively rely on their own judgment (Ou et al., 2014). While it has never
been empirically tested, I would expect a weak negative relationship between hubris and
humility based on the conceptual differences described above.
In sum, it appears that humility is a distinct construct from other traits in its
nomological network. While narcissism may be negatively related to the low self-focus
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dimension of humility and an internal locus of control may be captured by both CSE and
humility, there are also certain important conceptual and empirical distinctions.

Correlates of Humility
In this section, I review the literature on the influence of humility in the context of
both workplace behaviors and leadership.

Humility and Workplace Behaviors
I first review the influence of humility on general workplace behaviors. Most of
the research on humility in the workplace has focused on its impact on decision-making
and cooperative behaviors. For example, using students and lower level employees
samples, humility was found to be positively related with fair decision making (Hilbig &
Zettler, 2009) and prosocial behaviors (Exline & Geyer, 2004). Using a semiexperimental study, Hilbig and Zettler (2009) found that individuals who score high on
the honesty-humility scale tended to act in a more cooperative fashion – they chose
solutions that were fair for all, even when they could have defected without fearing
negative consequences. Similarly, Hillbig, Zettler, Leist, and Heydasch (2013) found
honestly-humility to be related to active cooperation, that is, “the tendency to be fair and
genuine in dealing with others, in the sense of cooperating with others even when one
might exploit them without suffering retaliation” (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156). In
addition, honesty-humility has been found to be related to integrity-based outcomes such
as ethical decision-making (Lee, Ashton, Morrison, Cordery, & Dunlop, 2008).
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Individuals high on honesty-humility were also less likely to commit vengeful acts (i.e.,
"getting even") in reaction to transgressions or provocations (Lee & Ashton, 2012).
Similarly, honesty-humility has also been found to be related to several forgivenessrelated variables (Perugini et al., 2013; Shepherd & Belicki, 2008; Sheppard & Boon,
2012).
Johnson, Rowatt, and Petrini (2011) found that honesty-humility was predictive,
over and above the other five traits included in the Big 5, of employee job performance
(rated by superiors) in care giving roles. Their rationale was that since honesty-humility
is associated with cooperativeness, as opposed to selfishness (Ashton & Lee, 2001,
2007), more humble employees may outperform others in jobs that require more patience,
understanding, and empathy. Honesty-humility was also found to predict lower levels of
counterproductive work behaviors (Marcus et al., 2007), including workplace
delinquency (Lee & Ashton, 2005).
In sum, humble individuals appear to engage in more prosocial behaviors in the
workplace, and tend to be ethical and fair in their decisions. Even though the
aforementioned studies were not directly tested in the leadership context, similar
arguments could be used to study leader humility. For example, is humility a predictor of
ethical leadership? Considering humble individuals engage in more cooperative
behaviors, are humble leaders more likely to include others in decision making? In the
next section, I review the correlates of humility which have been tested specifically in the
context of leadership.
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Humility and Leadership
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in studying humility in the
context of leadership (Ou et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2013) and perhaps surprisingly,
published articles on the topic are almost exclusively conceptual in nature (Owens &
Hekman, 2012). Leadership scholars have suggested that leader humility is important to
organizational effectiveness (e.g., Morris et al., 2005; Owens & Hekman, 2012, Vera &
Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004), but solid empirical evidence, to confirm the proposed
relationships, is still lacking. For example, leader humility has been argued (but not
empirically tested) to be related to organizational learning, organizational resilience
(Vera & Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004), follower engagement, relational trust and loyalty,
psychological freedom, small continuous change (Owens & Heckman, 2012),
supportiveness toward others, socialized power motivation, participative leadership
(Morris et al., 2005), and socialized charismatic leadership (Nielsen, Marrone, & Slay,
2010).
Whereas the majority of what has been published is conceptual, some recent
empirical studies have begun to uncover the potential correlates of leader humility. Here I
limit my review to empirical papers that have directly tested the impact of humility on
different outcomes. Even though humility is an important component of authentic
leadership, those studies are not included here since their hypotheses refer to authentic
leadership as a unified construct, and fail to disentangle the impact of each of the
humility sub-facet.
Owens and colleagues (2013) is one of the rare published studies that directly
tests for the outcomes of leader humility. Using a sample of 218 leaders from large U.S
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health services organizations, the authors found that leader expressed humility
(operationalized as the common core of teachability, appreciation of others, and selfawareness) was positively related to a host of outcomes at the employee- and team-levels,
namely job engagement, job satisfaction, retention, team learning orientation, and team
member engagement. Their findings suggest that the receptivity to feedback, openness to
learn, and the realistic view of oneself, which characterizes humble leaders, tends to
create a positive work environment where followers feel engaged, satisfied, and open to
constantly learn and adapt. Another recent paper by Ou, Su, Chiu and Owens (2014)
found leader humility to be associated with follower perception of leader charisma. They
argued that followers tend to perceive humble leaders as more charismatic, since they
emphasize a followers' worth and are able to articulate a vision that is not for personal
glory, but that also includes the interests of others.
Recently, in addition to identifying the potential correlates of humility, scholars
have started to look at boundary conditions. The question is shifting from "Is humility an
important characteristic for leaders to possess?" to "Under what conditions is humility
likely to have a greater or more pronounced impact?." Followers' personality, cultural
influence and status incongruence have all been examined as potential moderating
conditions (Sun, 2014; Daniels, Greguras, Bashshu, & Oc, 2014; Ou, Su, Chiu, & Owens,
2014). For example, Daniels and colleagues (2014) argued (and found empirical support
for) that humble leaders have a greater effect on high power distance followers, since it
reduces the social distance between leaders and followers, thus increasing relationship
quality and job satisfaction.
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In sum, literature on the correlates of leader humility has been mostly conceptual
in nature (Owens et al., 2013; Owens & Hekman, 2012). The few recent empirical studies
suggested humble leaders are effective, in part, because they stimulate follower
engagement and performance through a feeling of empowerment and close cooperation
(Ou et al., 2014). However, most published studies have focused on subjective outcomes
at the individual level (e.g., job satisfaction, work engagement) (Ou et al., 2014; Owens
et al., 2013), limiting our understanding of the impact of leader humility on more
objective outcomes. In the next section, I discuss potential avenues to study humility in
the Upper Echelons context, suggesting a different set of dependent variables (i.e.,
outcomes) since CEOs are a rare case where an individual's personality shows up in firmlevel outcomes.

Humility in the Context of Upper Echelons Research
In the last 30 years, research findings have consistently found evidence that
organizational strategies and outcomes can be better comprehended by studying the
characteristics of the senior executives who perceive, interpret, and make decisions on
behalf of their organizations (Hambrick, 1984, 2007; Kaiser et al., 2008). Often referred
to as the Upper Echelons Perspective, scholars have studied a wide array of CEO
demographic characteristics, personality traits, values and cognitions – linking them to
critical organizational-level outcomes (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Even
though in its original conceptualization (Hambrick, 1984), the emphasis was on all of the
members of the top management team, the wide majority of Upper Echelons studies have
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focused on CEOs (Hiller & Beauchesne, 2014) which are often argued to have a
disproportionate and dominating influence on their firms (Hambrick, 1994).
An important stream of research within the Upper Echelons Perspective is the
consequences of CEO's views of self on firm's strategies and outcomes. In other words,
do the ways CEOs think of themselves have a tangible impact on their organizations'
behaviors? Initial interest in the idea of CEO's self-view can be traced to the work of
Richard Roll (1986) on the "hubris hypothesis" where he suggested overpayments for
corporate acquisitions are the consequences of hubris on the part of the bidding CEOs.
Empirical research on CEOs' views of self has focused mainly on hubris, narcissism,
overconfidence and core self-evaluations (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011;
Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Li & Tang, 2010; Resick et al., 2009; Simsek, Heavey, &
Veiga, 2010; Zhang, Peterson, & Reina, 2013). Those traits, which can be considered the
"high" end of the self-view spectrum, have been found to be predictive of a host of
strategic outcomes. For example, CEO narcissism was found to predict glory-seeking
behaviors such as large-scale strategic changes (e.g., acquisitions) that sometimes appear
to be successful, and other times not so successful (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). A
CEO's core self-evaluations (i.e., the global and stable evaluation one makes about one's
own self-worth and capabilities) was found to be related to the firms' entrepreneurial
orientations (Simsek et al., 2010).
While there is growing empirical evidence that those "high" end self-concept
personality traits have important strategic implications for organizations (see Hiller &
Beauchesne, 2014, for a review), we have yet to fully explore how humility fits in the
CEO's view of self literature. With the exception of Ou and colleagues (2014) who found
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that CEO humility was predictive of a host of positive subjective outcomes at the
employee- (e.g., job satisfaction, organizational commitment) and team-level (e.g., top
management team integration), we have a limited understanding of the strategic
implications of humility in the context of executive leadership. In essay 3, I look at the
potential relationship between CEO humility and objective firm-level outcomes.
In the next section, I suggest two avenues to move our understanding of the
implications of humility in the Upper Echelons context forward: 1) the development of
new ways to capture CEO humility and 2) the study of the strategic implications of CEO
humility (i.e., its impact on objective firm-level outcomes).

Measurement of CEO humility
An important challenge associated with humility research has been the ability to
reliably measure the construct and its different components (Morris et al., 2005). There
appears to be two major impediments to studying humility in CEOs. First, is the issue
regarding self-report measures of humility. Researchers have argued, for example, that
individuals who report themselves as exceptionally humble may, paradoxically, be the
opposite of humble (Morris et al., 2005; Ou et al., 2014). As a result, humility has often
been argued to be measured best using other-report surveys (Ou et al., 2014; Tangney,
2000).
Second, the difficulty of measuring the construct adds to the already challenging
task of getting access to CEOs to measure humility via self-reports, or the difficulty even
of gaining access to others who know (and may be able to rate) a given CEO in the case
of other-reported measures of humility.
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One potential alternative, which is gaining popularity in Upper Echelons research,
is the development of unobtrusive measures (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011;
Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Unobtrusive measures are usually based on public
information about CEOs, documentary sources, and/or their written and oral
communications as ways to learn about their preferences and natural inclinations (Webb
et al., 1966). The use of an unobtrusive measure is particularly appealing for the study of
CEOs, considering their public status and extensive media coverage. The sensitive
character regarding CEOs' views of self (and consequent low likelihood they would agree
on participating in a survey on such a delicate topic) has motivated scholars to develop
unobtrusive measures for both CEO narcissism and hubris (Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007, 2011; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Li & Tang, 2010). Using a similar approach, I
suggest and validate an unobtrusive measure of humility in essay two.
In addition, the development and validation of an unobtrusive measure of humility
may also contribute to the debate as to how humility relates to other traits, such as hubris
and narcissism. Perhaps some indicators suggested to capture CEO narcissism may, in
fact, be imperfect indicators of both narcissism and low humility. More importantly, new
indicators capturing the different dimensions of humility should provide additional
evidence of the uniqueness of the multi-faceted trait of humility.

Strategic Outcomes of Humility
Given the long history of evidence demonstrating that the characteristics of senior
leaders manifest in the types of strategies their organizations pursue and outcomes that
result, I suggest that the construct of humility might be another useful avenue for
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exploring strategic and performance outcomes of firms. In particular, the need for a longterm horizon and capacity to adapt to complex situations which characterize leadership at
senior executive levels (Hiller & Beauchesne, 2014) may be influenced by CEO humility
– CEOs' orientation toward not seeking the spotlight, listening to others' advices, and
constantly learning and adapting.
Most accumulated evidence in regards to humility (in both executive and nonexecutive settings) has focused on its impact on subjective outcomes such as job
satisfaction, work engagement, and superior performance ratings (Ou et al., 2014; Owens
et al., 2013). While several studies have suggested followers appreciate working for
humble leaders, who often display a more participative and empowering style of
leadership (Daniels, Greguras, Bashshur, & Oc, 2014; Ou et al., 2014; Owens et al.,
2013), we have yet to understand their impact on more objective organizational outcomes
such as firm performance. The demonstration that humility also impacts objective
performance outcomes appears critical in order for humility to be recognized as an
important leadership characteristic.
CEO humility may also be linked to social outcomes at the firm-level. For
example, considering humble CEOs are more likely to integrate the needs of different
stakeholders (Ou et al., 2014), they may influence their organizations to be more ethical
and socially responsible. Studying the influence of CEO humility on outcomes, such as
corporate misconduct, earning restatements, environmental ratings and corporate social
performance, represents interesting avenues for future research. In essay 3, I test the
influence of CEO humility on both objective measures of performance and corporate
social performance.
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An important challenge for researchers is to make sure the arguments used to link
CEO humility to organizational-level outcomes are not merely the opposite of those used
in the cases of narcissism or hubris. While there is growing evidence that humility is both
conceptually and empirically distinct from other self-view traits, such as narcissism, CSE,
and hubris (Ou et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2013), I suggest some of the confusion stands
from the fact that the arguments used by scholars to link humility to different outcomes
are often similar (and in some cases identical) to previous research on other self-view
traits. As an example, Morris, Brotheridge, and Urbanski (2005) suggested that CEOs
who possess humility behave in a way that is other-enhancing (as opposed to selfenhancing) and stay away from attention and public adulation. Similarly, Chatterjee and
Hambrick (2007) suggested that narcissistic CEOs engage in attention-getting behaviors
to gain the attention and admiration of the audience. While both statements may be true,
the use of similar arguments in developing hypotheses can potentially lead readers to
think humility is merely the opposite of narcissism. Thus, it appears critical for scholars
interested in humility research to clearly state how humility is likely to impact the
suggested outcomes beyond anti-narcissism. This could be done by examining how the
different dimensions of humility are related to the outcomes of interest instead of
focusing mainly on the low self-focus aspect of humility that considerably overlaps with
anti-narcissism.

Conclusion
Considering recent findings suggesting that humility of individuals (and in
particular those in positions of leadership) is related to a host of important
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behaviors/outcomes, it appears critical to conduct more research to explore how (and if) it
is also associated with positive outcomes in the unique case of executive leadership,
where the firm-level implications (and implications for employees, shareholders, and
other stakeholders) are often truly significant. Conducting research on the strategic
implications of CEO humility also responds to a recent call in literature to study objective
outcomes of leader humility, for which most existing research has focused on subjective
individual-level outcomes (Ou et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2013). In addition, the inclusion
of humility in the Upper Echelons literature will hopefully broaden the discussion on the
strategic implications of executive self-concept beyond the traditional dimensions of
narcissism, hubris and CSE to provide a more rich and nuanced understanding of the
delicate interplay and implications of executive self-concept.
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II. Development and Validation of an Unobtrusive Measure of CEO Humility

Abstract
In this second chapter, an unobtrusive measure of CEO humility is developed and
validated. The partial indicators of humility are described and then validated using a
self-reported survey administered to a sample of 30 U.S. and Canadian CEOs. Results
suggest that CEO involvement in non-profit organizations and their acknowledgement of
the importance of boards of directors to firm success, are both significantly and
positively related to self-reported humility scores. Potential implications in moving CEO
humility research forward are discussed.

Introduction
Previous research on the topic of leader humility has mainly been conceptual in
nature (Owens & Hekman, 2012) and the difficulty in measuring humility is often cited
as one of the important reasons why empirical studies are rare (Ou et al., 2014; Owens et
al., 2013). Developing new ways of measuring the construct of humility, that do not
exclusively rely on self-reports, has been argued to be a critical task in order to move the
research on humility forward (Exline et al., 2004; Ou, 2011; Owens, 2009; Tangney,
2002). Thus far, scholars have measured humility via self-reported, other-reported, and
implicit measures. Self-reported measures have been greatly criticized because of the
potential threat of social desirability, and have also been found to have a weaker validity
than other-reported measures (Ou, 2011; Owens et al., 2013). In the Upper Echelons
context, the difficulty in measuring humility adds to the already difficult task of either
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gaining direct access to CEOs in order to measure humility via self-reports or even
gaining access to others who know (and may be able to rate) a given CEO in the case of
other-reported measures of humility. In this essay, I suggest a number of ways that CEO
humility may be indirectly estimated through reliably attainable data from public and
proprietary sources, and examine evidence for the validity of these suggested observable
indicators.
Upper Echelons theorists who are interested in studying the characteristics of
senior executives, but without access to self-reported measures as is typically done in
personality psychology, have relied on unobtrusive measures as a way of capturing senior
executives' preferences and natural inclinations (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Chatterjee
& Hambrick, 2007). Based on public information available about CEOs, documentary
sources, and/or their written and oral communications (Webb et al., 1966), unobtrusive
measures are particularly appealing when studying sensitive traits such as CEOs' views of
self (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
Unobtrusive measures are becoming more prevalent in Upper Echelons studies
(Hiller & Beauchesne, 2014), as a way to avoid low response rates usually associated
with self- and other-reported CEO surveys (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006) and to take
advantage of the abundant information available on CEOs of publicly-traded companies.
Unobtrusive measures have already been developed and are being used for other selfview traits, such as hubris and narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Hayward
& Hambrick, 1997; Li & Tang, 2010). While proxy (i.e., unobtrusive) measures have
proven to have predictive validity, the extent to which they overlap (i.e., are correlated)
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with existing measures (i.e., convergent validity) is often left unanswered (Hiller &
Beauchesne, 2014).
In this study, I suggest and validate potential humility indicators using a sample of
30 CEOs. More specifically, I: 1) review existing methods used to measure humility; 2)
describe potential unobtrusive humility indicators and their overlap with the different
dimensions of humility; and 3) perform a validation study to assess the validity of the
suggested unobtrusive indicators of humility.

Existing Methods to Measure Humility
The construct of humility has usually been assessed using three main types of
measures: self-reports, other-reports, and implicit measures of humility.
Self-reported measures of humility have been severely criticized for their
potential biases due to social desirability and their poor convergent and discriminant
validities (Owens, 2009; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Rowatt et al., 2006; Tangney,
2002). In addition to the potential threat of social desirability, Owens and colleagues
(2013) argued that self-reported measures of humility are conceptually inadequate –
individuals who rate themselves as exceptionally humble may, in fact, be the opposite of
humble. While self-reported measures have been greatly criticized, Ou (2011) argued that
the person themselves could best measure some dimensions of humility. Whereas close
observers may be able to rate the more behavioral aspects of humility, they may fail to
assess its more internal components (i.e., the motivational and cognitive aspects of
humility). For example, close others may not be able to easily observe another’s level of
self-awareness. Ou (2011) developed a self- and other-reported measure of humility,
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which both showed an acceptable measurement model, high reliability, and convergent
validity.
In order to circumvent the potential drawbacks of self-reported humility
measures, scholars are increasingly using other-reported measures (e.g., Morris et al.,
2005, Ou et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2013), such as Ou and colleagues (2014) who
measured CEO humility through questionnaires administered to top management team
(TMT) members. While other-reported measures have shown stronger validity than CEO
self-reported measures of humility (Ou et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2013) using close
others also raises some significant concerns. First, some dimensions of humility, such as
self-awareness, are internal, making it difficult for close others to accurately rate a CEO.
Thus, close others will potentially overemphasize the more behavioral aspects of
humility, as opposed to the more cognitive/motivational components. This could partly
explain why Owens (2009) found a much stronger correlation between humility and
narcissism when measured via other-reports (r = -.64) as opposed to self-reports (r = .16) – close others may be using similar behavioral markers to assess both the humble
and narcissistic tendencies of the ratee. Second, in the context of Upper Echelons studies,
the use of other-reported surveys does not eliminate the threat of low-response rates since
the executives that have direct relationships with CEOs (i.e., those who may be able to
rate a CEO's humility) are just as likely to be difficult to reach as the CEOs themselves.
In addition, not only may a CEO be reluctant to let their TMT or other members of their
organizations report on their personality, but the use of other-reports causes investigators
to obtain multiple responses (at least two) for each CEO included in their study,
potentially leading to even lower response rates.
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Lastly, Rowatt and colleagues (2006) developed an implicit measure of humility,
relying on the individual's reaction times in associating attributes, such as humility or
arrogance, with the self or others. Humble individuals are expected to link humilityrelated concepts with the self more rapidly than arrogant-related concepts. Implicit
measures cannot be easily faked or controlled by participants, which has been argued to
be an advantage over self-reports when the threat for social desirability is high (Banse,
Seise, & Zerbes, 2001). Results from the implicit measure of humility have showed a
positive significant correlation (r=.26) with an explicit self-reported measure of humility
– suggesting convergent validity (Rowatt et al., 2006). While the implicit measure of
humility developed by Rowatt and colleagues (2006) is promising, it would be extremely
difficult to persuade CEOs (especially of large publicly-traded firms) to participate in
such a research project.
In sum, reliably measuring humility is still an unsolved problem in psychology
(Tangney, 2002) and all three suggested methods of measurement possess important
concerns. While self-reported measures may be biased due to social desirability, close
others may potentially overemphasize the behavioral components of humility when
measuring a ratee's humble tendencies (due to their incapacity to observe the more
internal aspects of humility). Implicit measures of humility represent an interesting
alternative to the traditional self- and other-reported measurement methods; however
respondents may be reluctant to participate in research relying on implicit personality
measures since they may feel uncomfortable with not having full control over how they
are being portrayed (Rowatt et al., 2006). When possible, scholars should aim at
collecting data on humility from multiple sources and examine how the different
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measures relate to one another. In the next section, I suggest potential unobtrusive
humility indicators in response to the recent call in literature for new ways of measuring
humility (Morris et al., 2005; Ou et al., 2014).

Proposed Unobtrusive Indicators of Humility
In order to identify unobtrusive humility indicators, two main search criteria were
used. First, the indicator needed to capture one, or multiple, dimensions of humility.
Second, the indicator needed to be substantially under the control of the CEO, such that
the indicator could be reasonably presumed to be representative primarily of the CEO and
not external factors such as the industry, corporate structural characteristics, or others.
After searching and reviewing potential data sources, I suggest below 10 possible
indicators of humility. The proposed humility indicators are described below and
organized here according to the presumed aspect of humility which the unobtrusive
indicator represents. As previously discussed in Essay 1, those four dimensions are:
developmental orientation/teachability, self-awareness, appreciation of others' strengths
and contributions, and low self-focus. While indicators often fit more than one dimension
of humility, they are herein classified within the dimension they most clearly capture.

1. Developmental Orientation/Teachability
Education Level
The level of formal education of top executives has been suggested to be a proxy
for individuals' competencies and knowledge (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wiersema &
Bantel, 1992) and has also been argued to reflect one's open-mindedness and propensity
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to explore new alternatives (Datta & Rajagopalans, 1998). As such, an executive’s
educational level has been found to be associated with a receptivity to innovation
(Becker, 1970; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971). Similarly,
humility (and its dimension of teachability) is said to encompass an open-mindedness,
desire to learn, and openness to advice (Tangney, 2002). Teachability is often described
as a person's absorptive capacity on an individual level, which is generally related to
developmental readiness (Owens et al., 2013). As such, I expect a CEO’s educational
level to be positively correlated with humility (and its dimension of teachability).
Consistent with others who have examined this variable, CEO educational level
was coded using an ordinal variable ranging from one to six – below high school, high
school, college diploma, university, master’s degree, and doctorate (e.g., Li & Tang,
2010).

Breadth of Educational Studies
I introduce executives' breadth of studies as a new construct defined as the
number of unique fields of study in one's academic career. While pursuing higher
education may reflect a learning orientation, interest in pursuing studies in different fields
also suggests a curiosity and desire to learn about different paradigms and ways of
thinking. This intellectual curiosity is also an integral component of humility that
suggests humble individuals have an open and receptive mind (Templeton, 1997). As a
result, I expect a CEO’s breadth of educational studies to be positively related to humility
(and its dimension of teachability).
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Breadth of educational studies was coded as a count variable – for example, a
CEO with an undergraduate degree in engineering followed by an Master in Business
Administration would receive a "2" for two unique fields of study.

Career Variety
Career variety is defined as the range of distinct professional and institutional
experiences (i.e., functional tracks, organizations, and industries) an executive has
experimented prior to being appointed as CEO (Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick,
2014). For example, a CEO who has worked his entire career in finance for the same
organization would have a low career variety score as compared to a CEO who has
assumed different responsibilities in multiple organizations and industries. Over time, the
diversity in a CEO's functional and institutional experiences have been found to be
significantly correlated to openness to experience (Crossland et al., 2014). The notion of
openness to different ideas and feedback is central to humility and its dimension of
teachability (Owens, 2009). As a result, I expect CEO career variety to be positively
related with humility (and its dimension of teachability).
Following the methodology of Crossland and colleagues (2014), career variety
was measured using three indicators: inter-firm mobility (i.e., total number of unique
firms), inter-industry mobility (i.e., total number of unique industries), and functional
area mobility (i.e., total number of unique functions). An overall career variety score was
calculated for each CEO as the sum of the three indicators divided by the number of years
the person worked prior to becoming CEO.
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2. Self-Awareness
TMT Diversity
TMT diversity is defined as how dissimilar (or similar) top management team
members are in regards to several characteristics such as age, educational fields of study,
gender, functional experiences, etc (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In literature, it has
mainly been used as an indicator for diversity of information, perspectives, creativity, and
innovation in decision-making (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Research on CEO succession
has shown that the appointment of new CEOs leads to important changes in TMT
composition and function – CEOs appear to have considerable leeway when it comes to
the composition of their TMTs (Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000).
Humility and its component of self-awareness is often described as "know
yourself, improve yourself and complement yourself" (Tjan, 2012). While the first two
elements are hardly observable, we can examine how CEOs' surround themselves in their
organizations via the composition of their TMTs. Self-aware individuals know that it is
not possible for anyone to be above-average across all business-building traits and
recognize the importance to be surrounded by the right complement of people (Tjan,
2012). As such, we would expect humble CEOs (who are characterized as self-aware) to
pay particular attention to having the right mix of people in their TMTs. In addition,
humble individuals value the unique contributions of others and see opportunities to learn
and grow from them instead of perceiving them as threats (Owens, 2009; Owens et al.,
2013). Thus, I expect humble CEOs to embrace diversity when it comes to the
composition of their top management teams, and see diversity as an opportunity to gain
access to different points of view and perspectives.
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Each firm TMT included all executives above the vice-president level (e.g.,
senior vice-president, executive vice-president, chief operating officer) (Michel &
Hambrick, 1992; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996). TMT diversity was coded using two
indicators: functional experience diversity and educational background diversity. First,
TMT functional experience diversity was coded by determining the dominant functional
track (i.e., function in which the TMT member has spent the greatest portion of his/her
career) for each TMT member: 1) production-operations; 2) research and development
(including engineering); 3) accounting and finance; 4) management and administration;
5) marketing and sales; 6) law; 7) personnel and labor relations; and 8) other (Michel &
Hambrick, 1992). Since functional experience was coded as a categorical variable, TMT
functional diversity was computed using a diversity index (Blau, 1977). The second
indicator of job-related diversity is TMT educational background diversity. Educational
experience was coded as the academic major in the highest degree of education obtained
by the TMT member. Following Wiersema and Bantel (1992), five educational
specialization categories were used to classify each TMT member’s educational
experience: 1) arts; 2) sciences; 3) engineering; 4) business and economics; and 5) law.
Since educational experience is also a categorical variable, a diversity index was
developed for TMT educational diversity (Blau, 1977).

3. Appreciation of others' strengths and contributions
CEO Acknowledgement of the Importance of other Stakeholders
The first measure of appreciation of others was derived through content analysis
of letters to shareholders. Company annual reports are opportunities for CEOs to report to
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shareholders on their organizations' performance and progress, but they also represent an
opportunity for a CEO to showcase their management philosophies and styles (Chatterjee
& Hambrick, 2007). Communication specialists have agreed in saying CEOs are very
attentive to the content and design of annual reports (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
Letters to shareholders were analyzed to find any mention that the work and
contribution of employees, TMT members or board members, was pivotal to firm
success. The author manually coded all instances where the work of other stakeholders
was acknowledged in the letters to shareholders. Manual coding was selected over
automated content analysis, considering that the interest was not in the use of particular
words, but more the general idea that the work and development of others was vital to
organizational success.
The measure was operationalized as an ordinal variable (0,1,2). CEOs received a
"2" if they mentioned the importance of other stakeholders in multiple occasions, "1" if it
was mentioned once, and a "0" when it was not mentioned at all. Two annual letters to
shareholders were coded for each CEO (i.e., years two and three of a CEO’s tenure). This
operationalization was preferred since it distinguishes between letters which truly
emphasize the importance of other stakeholders (coded as "2") versus the ones in which
one generic sentence is included at the end to thank the employees for their hard work
and commitment (coded as a "1").

Photographs in Annual Reports
The use of pictures in annual reports can also reveal some interesting information
about a CEO’s personality. As mentioned by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), CEOs are
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very attentive to the content of the annual report, especially regarding how they are being
portrayed. As such, we can expect humble CEOs, characterized as having a low selffocus and an appreciation for others, to avoid big self-promoting pictures of themselves
in annual reports. Humble CEOs are likely to prefer pictures of themselves along with
other senior executives (displaying their appreciation for other key members in their
organizations) or have no picture (consistent with their low self-focus and low need for
self-advertisement).
The measure was coded as an ordinal variable (i.e., 1,2,3): CEOs received a “3” if
there was no picture in the annual report or if the CEO was photographed with one or
more senior executives; “2” if the CEO was photographed by himself but the picture was
smaller than half of a page, and a “1” when the CEO was photographed by himself in a
picture larger than half of a page.

4. Low Self-Focus
Salary Ratio (Cash and Non-Cash Compensation)
The first two proposed indicators of CEO low self-focus were coded as a CEO's
cash compensation (and non-cash compensation) divided by the compensation of the
second-highest executive in the firm. Prior research has suggested CEOs have
considerable power when it comes to determining their own pay (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia,
1989; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Used as a measure of self-importance (Hayward &
Hambrick, 1997) and narcissism (Chatterjee &Hambrick, 2007, 2011), CEO
compensation, relative to other executives, reflects how important and valuable the CEO
thinks he or she is compared to anyone else in the firm. Humble individuals,
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characterized as having a low self-focus, do not seek to reap excessive benefits and are
less attracted by materialism or excessive luxury (Rowatt et al., 2006). Thus, I expect the
disparity between CEO compensation (cash and non-cash) and that of the second-highest
executive to be smaller for humble CEOs (Rowatt et al., 2006).
CEO's relative cash compensation was operationalized as the CEO's salary and
bonus divided by that of the second-highest-paid executive. CEO's relative non-cash
compensation was operationalized as the sum of the CEO's deferred income, stock grants,
and stock options divided by that of the second-highest-paid executive.

Participation on Non-Profit Boards
The low self-focus, which characterizes humble individuals, also translates to a
desire to serve a larger purpose than the self (Ou, 2011). Their pursuit in life is not about
themselves but the larger community (Owens, 2009). As such, we would expect humble
CEOs to put their business expertise to the service of others. Sitting on the boards of
non-profit organizations is one way CEOs can give back to society. By participating on
boards of non-profit organizations, CEOs have the opportunity to use their notoriety and
business knowledge to the benefit of the society. I argue that such type of board
membership would be privileged by humble CEOs who are characterized as having a
desire to serve a greater purpose than the self.
A CEO’s participation on boards of non-profits was coded as a binary variable –
"1" for CEOs with board memberships in one or multiple non-profits, and "0" otherwise.
This operationalization was preferred to a count variable considering the data available in
the different databases did not allow a clear determination of the level of commitment
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and time invested by CEOs in the different non-profits. For example, a CEO who is the
chair of one non-profit may invest more time than another CEO who is a board member
on two non-profits. Additionally, the binary operationalization showed great variability
with 47% of the CEOs with board membership(s) on non-profits, and the remaining 53%
who are not associated with any non-profits.

Validation Study
To ensure the reliability and validity of the suggested unobtrusive measures, a
validation study was conducted to examine their relationships with a self-report measure
of humility. In a recent book chapter, Hiller and Beauchesne (2014) urged Upper
Echelons scholars to pay more attention to the validation process of CEO personality
proxies. They emphasized that showing predictive validity (i.e., finding a relationship
between a proxy measure and firm-level outcomes) does not prove the proxy is
measuring the underlying construct we are inferring it to measure. Is the size of a CEO’s
signature really measuring one's narcissistic tendencies (Ham et al., 2013)? Does having
a pilot license a good proxy for CEO risk propensity (Cain & McKeon, 2012)? In many
cases, even though the rational may be compelling, there is very little empirical evidence
offered as to the validity of the suggested inferences. More recently, there has been a few
instances where proxy variables have been validated in a more systematic way.
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) asked financial analysts to rate the narcissistic
tendencies of a sub-sample of 35 CEOs. Ham and colleagues (2013) tested their measure
with a sample of 53 MBA students correlating the NPI-16 (i.e., a common self-report
measure of narcissism) to the size of the students' signatures. Considering proxy
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measures are developed in the first place to circumvent the difficulty to access CEOs,
scholars need to be creative in finding ways to validate their unobtrusive measures.
Although the validation process can be tedious, and sometimes only partial validation can
be performed, the exercise is critical to the veracity of our assertions about the potential
relationships between CEO personality traits and organizational outcomes.

Validation Sample
Collecting data directly from senior executives can be challenging and often leads
to low response rates (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006). Surveys on sensitive topics, such as
CEO narcissism or humility, are likely to yield even lower response rates (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007; Cycyota & Harrison, 2006). In order to gain access to CEOs and
maximize participation in this research study, a snowball sample was utilized. Snowball
samples initially target a few informants who nominate, through their social networks,
other participants who fit the eligibility criteria for a given study (Goodman, 1961).
Snowball samples are considered acceptable to survey hard-to-reach populations or topics
of sensitive nature (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981).
CEOs included in the validation study were recruited through three different
channels: 1) personal contacts of authors; 2) personal networks of two Canadian CEOs;
and 3) the FIU Center for Leadership's network. Through our different recruiting
channels, 52 CEOs were invited to participate in the study (see invitation email letter in
Appendix A) – 17 CEOs via the FIU Center for Leadership, 27 CEOs via the personal
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networks of two Canadian CEOs, and 8 CEOs via the personal contacts of authors. 30
CEOs completed the online survey for a response rate of 58 percent.
In exchange for their participation in the study, participants were offered a report
of the main findings, following the completion of the research project. As a further
inducement for companies/CEOs, I sent a "2014 FIU Partner-In-Research Seal" to those
CEOs who requested the seal after survey completion. At their discretion, companies
were granted permission to display this seal on corporate documents/websites. No
financial compensation was offered to participants.
The means for revenues and full-time employees for the companies included in
the validation sample are respectively $25M and 100 employees. Two companies were
identified as not-for-profits and the remaining 28 companies were for-profit
organizations. The sample comprised six U.S. and 24 Canadian firms. The average age
of the CEOs was between 50 and 54 years old. In addition, 60% of them were both the
CEO and chair of the board, and 60% were founding members of their organizations.
Distribution tables for the revenues, number of employees and industry of the
participating firms can be found in Figures 2, 3 and 4.

42

Figure 2: Validation Sample - Firm Revenues Distribution
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Figure 3: Validation Sample - Total Number of Employees Distribution
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Figure 4: Validation Sample - Industry Distribution
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Measures
Humility Scale
Humility was measured using items from Owens and colleagues (2013) and Ou
and colleagues (2014). Each of the four dimensions of humility (i.e., self-awareness,
appreciation of others' strengths, teachability, and low self-focus) were measured using
three items and CEOs had to choose a response that ranged from "strongly agree" to
"strongly disagree" (i.e., 5-point scale). Overall humility scores were calculated by taking
the mean score across all 12 individual humility items. Analyses were also run
exclusively using the nine humility items suggested by Owens and colleagues (2013)
(which exclude the low self-focus dimension).

Other Traits
In order to evaluate convergent and discriminant validity, measures of narcissism,
openness to experience, extraversion, and emotional stability were also included in the
survey. Considering that CEOs often do not have time to complete lengthy surveys, brief
validated scales were preferred. Narcissism was measured using the NPI-16 (Ames,
Rose, & Anderson, 2006), the questionnaire is based on 16 forced choices – one
narcissistic option and one non-narcissistic option. The NPI scores were calculated using
the mean score across all 16 items. Three dimensions of the Big 5 – openness to
experience, extraversion, and emotional stability – were measured using two items each
(Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). The six Big 5 items were measured using a 5-point
scale (i.e., “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) structure. Humility was expected to
show a weak to moderate negative correlation with narcissism, since both include in their
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definitions the individual's propensity to be self-centered as opposed to other-centered
(i.e., low self-focus dimension). A weak positive correlation was expected between
humility and emotional stability, since humble individuals are characterized as having a
stable sense of self-worth and self-respect (Owens, Rowatt, & Wilkins, 2011; Vera &
Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004). A weak positive correlation was also expected with openness to
experience since the teachabilty/openness to learn dimension of humility also captures an
individual’s interest and openness to different ideas and ways of doing things (Owens et
al., 2013). Lastly, no relationship was hypothesized for extraversion.

Unobtrusive Indicators of Humility
Considering that the validation sample comprised mostly of CEOs at the helm of
small- and medium-sized private firms (which do not publish annual reports or letters to
shareholders), the indicator relative to the size of the CEO’s photograph in the annual
report could not be validated. For other indicators, items were developed to obtain similar
information about the CEOs in our sample to what is usually found online or via different
databases for the CEOs of publicly-traded companies. As an example, traditionally,
Upper Echelons scholars have measured CEOs relative compensation using data on
executive compensation available on Execucomp (only available for publicly-traded
companies that have to disclose the total compensation of their top five executives).
Considering the nature of the organizations included in the validation sample (and
consequent unavailability of secondary data), an item was developed to capture CEOs
relative compensation – "What was the ratio between your total compensation (salary,
bonuses, equity, etc.) and the total compensation of the second-highest-paid executive in
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your firm last year?" Items were also developed to capture CEO career variety, CEO
breadth of educational studies, CEO education, CEO involvement in non-profits, CEO
acknowledgement of the importance of other stakeholders to firm success, and top
management team diversity (see Appendix B for all survey items).

Other Variables
The survey also included additional variables at the CEO- and firm-level. CEO's
age, tenure as CEO, founding status, inside versus outside appointment, and duality (i.e.,
the extent to which the CEO is also the chair of the board) were incorporated into the
survey. Information about firms' revenues, number of employees, main industry and forprofit versus not-for-profit status were also obtained.

Results
The results of the validation study are described below. I present: 1) the means
and variability measures for the different variables (i.e., items and scales); 2) the structure
and reliability of the self-report humility measure; 3) the relationships among humility
and other traits in its nomological network; and 4) the correlations between the selfreported measure of humility and the unobtrusive humility indicators.

Mean and Variance of Variables
There are a few notable findings regarding means and standard deviations of the
study variables (Table 1). First, participants' scores on the humility self-reported measure
show low variability with a standard deviation of .41 (mean = 4.5 out of 5 and
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coefficient of variation = 9%). While we may expect the self-reported scores on humility
to be slightly inflated by social desirability, narcissism (which is also a very sensitive
trait) showed more variability (mean = .32 out of 1 and coefficient of variation = 59%).
Coefficients of variation for emotional stability (mean = 3.95 out of 5 and coefficient of
variation = 23%), extraversion (mean = 3.48 out of 5 and coefficient of variation = 33%),
and openness to experience (mean = 4.13 out of 5 and coefficient of variation = 17%)
were also greater than for humility.

Table 1: Validation Sample Descriptive Statistics & Reliability Analyses

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Cronbach's
Alpha

Humility (4 dimensions)

4.35

.36

.751

Humility (3 dimensions)

4.5

.41

.877

Self-Awareness
Appreciation Others
Teachability
Low Self-focus

4.54
4.47
4.49
3.89

.40
.48
.49
.86

.583
.693
.843
.864

Narcissism

.32

.19

.718

Emotional Stability

3.95

.89

.558

Extraversion

3.48

1.15

.833

Openness

4.13

.69

.215

Level of Education

4.23

.82

Unique Fields of Studies

1.55

.69

Career Variety

10.17

3.80

Ratio Compensation

3.80

1.94

Non-Profit s

.63

.49

Importance TMT

4.70

.60

Importance Employees

4.80

.41

Importance Board

3.67

1.06

TMT Education Diversity

2.29

1.17

TMT Functional Diversity

2.30

1.23
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Figure 5: Validation Sample Boxplot - Measure of Variability
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In figure 5, in the boxplot we can observe that two variables – CEOs' ratings of
the importance of employees and top management teams to organizational success –
show almost zero variability. In other words, with the exception of one participant in the
case of the importance of employees and two participants in the case of the importance of
top management teams, all respondents rated the contribution of these two groups of
stakeholders to organizational success as "very important". Interestingly, the importance
of a third group of stakeholders (i.e., boards) generated more variability (mean = 3.67 out
of 5 and coefficient of variation = 29%).
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Table 2: Validation Sample Correlations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Variables
Humility (4 dimensions)
Humility (3 dimensions)
Self-Awareness
Appreciation Others
Teachability
Low Self-Focus
Narcissism
Emotional Stability
Extraversion
Openness
Education
Unique Fields Study
Career Variety (Avg)
Ratio Salary
Non-Profit
Importance TMT
Importance Employees
Importance Board
TMT Diversity (Education)
TMT Diversity (Functions)
Number Employees
Revenues
Duality
Age
CEO Tenure

1
1
.801**
.754**
.633**
.757**
.533**
-.327ϯ
.364*
-.191
.198
-.053
-.068
.029
-.127
.264
.064
-.114
.361*
-0.03
-.160
-.051
-.086
-.042
.155
-.203

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Variables
Non-Profit
Importance TMT
Importance Employees
Importance Board
TMT Diversity (Education)
TMT Diversity (Functions)
Number Employees
Revenues
Duality
Age
CEO Tenure

15
1
.319ϯ
-.208
.287
-.079
-.034
.212
.284
-.480**
.071
-.056

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1
.846**
.867**
.945**
-.079
-.133
.103
.182
.378*
-.112
.124
-.031
-.154
.343ϯ
.186
.005
.375*
-.03
-.151
-.122
-.203
.008
.009
-.130

1
.534**
.767**
.060
-.145
.193
.147
.270
-.051
.089
-.116
-.153
.294
.326ϯ
.057
.31ϯ
-.144
-.121
-.021
-.056
.093
-.061
.080

1
.736**
-.171
-.103
-.076
.211
.470**
-.146
.084
.068
-.115
.231
.115
-.023
.342ϯ
.133
-.106
-.055
-.177
-.086
.006
-.259

1
-.075
-.110
.175
.127
.256
-.093
.154
-.051
-.147
.387*
.086
-.011
.344ϯ
-.089
-.173
-.231
-.284
.028
.065
-.133

1
-.357*
.462**
-.576**
-.205
.071
-.286
.093
.007
-.045
-.156
-.196
.071
-.008
-.052
.087
.143
-.080
.246
-.154

1
-.188
.472**
.161
.109
.053
.129
-.100
-.074
.029
.084
-.164
-.077
.162
.105
.089
-.183
.015
-.025

1
-.211
0.067
-.149
-.124
.201
.263
.390*
.262
-.076
.036
.130
.076
.041
.167
-.163
-.037
-.046

1
.273
.041
.291
-.011
-.040
-.103
.295
.251
.108
.112
.067
.011
.018
-.012
-.430*
.095

1
-.209
.057
.312ϯ
.046
.301ϯ
.308ϯ
-.147
.109
.078
-.008
-.180
-.231
-.140
-.212
-.128

1
.561**
-.135
-.318ϯ
.049
-.064
-.062
-.186
.190
.186
.082
.225
-.102
.006
-.064

1
.015
-.070
.056
-.052
-.087
-.196
.081
-.191
-.139
-.135
.168
-.044
.409*

1
-.169
.127
.099
-.469**
-.131
.214
.194
-.076
.053
-.073
-.112
-.149

1
-.080
.245
.254
-.117
.179
.264
.161
.157
.200
-.113
.310ϯ

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1
.028
.273
.233
.463**
.215
.293
-.070
-.299
-.005

1
-.080
.126
.166
-.135
-.135
.272
-.221
.045

1
-.145
-.024
-.029
-.086
-.130
-.128
-.231

1
.641**
-.031
.067
-.025
-.406*
-.104

1
.185
.321ϯ
-.034
-.444*
.163

1
.914**
-.331ϯ
.175
.065

1
-.392*
.080
.024

1
-.232
.197

1
.040

1

Note: (ϯ) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.1; (*) less than 0.05; (**) less than 0.01
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Figure 6: Standardized Estimates - Confirmatory Factor Analysis
(Humility 4 dimensions)
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Figure 7: Standardized Estimates - Confirmatory Factor Analysis
(Humility 3 dimensions)
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Self-Reported Humility Measure
With the exception of the low self-focus dimension of humility, inter-correlations
among the three other dimensions of humility were fairly high (ranging from .53 to .77).
Low self-focus was not significantly correlated with the other three dimensions (ranging
from -.17 to .06). Overall humility scores were computed using both Owens' (2009) four
dimensions and Owens and colleagues' (2013) three dimensions (excluding low selffocus) humility definitions. The correlation between the two self-reported humility
measures (3 dimensions and 4 dimensions) was .80. The Cronbach's Alpha (Table 1) was
higher for the 9-item (three dimensions) conceptualization of humility than the 12-item
(four dimensions) conceptualization of humility (.88 as opposed to .75). Confirmatory
Factor Analyses (CFA) were performed for both the three dimensions (Figure 7)
definition of humility (Owens et al., 2013) and the four dimensions (Figure 6) definition
of humility (Owens, 2009). Both measures had acceptable measurement model goodness
of fit indices (CFI=.95, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.09 for the three dimensions measure of
humility; CFI= .92, TLI = .90, RMSEA=.09 for the four dimensions measure of
humility), although the three dimensions humility scale showed slightly better fit indices.
Evaluation of the fit indices was based on the cutoff values of .1 for RMSEA (Browne &
Cudeck, 1993) and .90 for CFI and TLI (Hu & Bentler, 1998).
Considering the Cronbach's Alpha and CFA fit indices were superior for the three
dimensions humility scale (Owens et al., 2013), subsequent results are reported based on
CEOs' scores on the 9-item humility scale.
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Humility, as expected, was unrelated (r=.009, non-significant) with CEO age,
which is consistent with the premise that humility is a fairly stable personality trait. In
addition, humility was not significantly related to firm size (operationalized as total
number of employees) – suggesting humility is not situational (r=-.122, non-significant).
In other words, it does not appear that CEOs of larger organizations are more or less
humble than CEOs of smaller organizations.

Nomological Network: Convergent and Discriminant Validity
Humility (Owens et al., 2013) and narcissism (NPI-16) showed a weak nonsignificant correlation (r=-.133, non-significant) – adding to the growing evidence that
humility is not merely the opposite of narcissism (Ou et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2013).
However, narcissism was found to be negatively related to low self-focus (r=-.357,
p<.05) which is included in several humility definitions (e.g., Ou et al., 2014; Owens,
2009; Tangney, 2002). Narcissism was also negatively related to the 4-dimension scale of
humility which includes low self-focus (r=-.327, p<.05). Correlations between humility
and emotional stability, extraversion, and openness respectively were .103 (nonsignificant), .182 (non-significant), and .378 (p<.05). Thus, the nomological and
discriminant validity of the humility measure showed adequate support.

Validation of Unobtrusive Indicators:
Humility measured using Owens and colleagues' 2013 scale was significantly
related (in the hypothesized direction) to two unobtrusive humility indicators. First,
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humility was positively related to CEO involvement in non-profit organizations (r=.343,
p<.05 one-tailed). When using only CEOs of firms with revenues of $1M and higher
(eliminating start-ups), that correlation goes up to .386 (N=28, p<.05 two-tailed). Second,
humility was positively related to the CEO acknowledgement of the importance of boards
to organizational success (r=.375, p<.05 one-tailed). Similarly, using hierarchical cluster
analysis, the dendogram in Figure 8 shows how CEO involvement in non-profits and
CEO acknowledgement of the importance of boards pertain to the same cluster than
humility – suggesting that those three variables exhibit similar distribution of correlation
coefficients. In other words, CEOs tended to respond similarly to these three variables.
The following indicators were not significantly related to self-reported humility: level of
education (r=-.112, non-significant), breadth of education (r=.124, non-significant),
career variety (r=-.031, non-significant), ratio salary (r=-.154, non-significant), CEO
acknowledgement of the importance of employees to organizational success (r=.005, nonsignificant), CEO acknowledgement of the importance of top management teams to
organizational success (r=.186, non-significant), top management team educational
diversity (r=-.03, non-significant), and top management team functional diversity (r=.151, non-significant).
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Figure 8: Validation Sample Hierarchical Cluster Analysis
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Discussion and Conclusion
This validation study provided support for two unobtrusive indicators of humility:
CEO participation in non-profits and CEO acknowledgement of the importance of boards
(i.e., other stakeholders) to organizational success. The involvement of humble CEOs in
non-profit organizations reinforces the idea that humbler individuals tend to be otherfocused as opposed to self-focused, and engage more in self-transcendent pursuits (Ou et
al., 2014). Considering board memberships on non-profits for CEOs of publicly-traded
companies can be found via different online sources and databases (e.g., Bloomberg
Database, Businessweek Executive Profiles, NNDB website, etc.), this opens up several
avenues for future research for Upper Echelons scholars.
The positive significant correlation found between CEO acknowledgement of the
importance of boards and CEO self-reported humility also has important implications. It
suggests humbler CEOs perceive more value in the input of boards and see their insights
as critical to firm success. This is aligned with the definition of humility that suggests
humble individuals appreciate and value (as opposed to feel threatened by) the work and
contributions of others (Exline et al., 2004; Owens, 2009; Tangney, 2002). While
(almost) all the CEOs in the sample rated the other two groups of stakeholders
(employees and top management teams) as "very important" to organizational success,
more variability was observed when rating the importance of boards. Boards are quite
different from TMTs and employees, in regards to their power relationships with CEOs –
their responsibilities include hiring and firing CEOs, as well as providing CEOs with
strategic advice and counsel (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Daily,
Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Zald, 1969). Less humble CEOs may not be as receptive to the
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input from their boards and might feel threatened by them – potentially explaining why
they rated them as less important.
In sum, the results show preliminary evidence that humbler CEOs tend to rate at
least one group of stakeholders as more important – boards of directors. Considering the
two items developed to measure how important CEOs think employees and TMTs are to
organizational success exhibited no variability, conclusions cannot be inferred for these
two groups of stakeholders. All CEOs emphasized the importance of the "team effort" to
organizational success, potentially due to social desirability. Content analysis of letters to
shareholders to find all instances where the CEO acknowledges the importance of other
stakeholders to firm success is likely to be a superior measure (and exhibit more
variability). I encourage researchers to use that method whenever possible (i.e., when
dealing with CEOs of publicly-traded firms).
Several limitations of the validation study may at least partly explain why I did
not find clear support for the other unobtrusive measures of humility. First, the sample
was relatively small (N=30) as is often the case in validation studies of CEOs unobtrusive
indicators (e.g., N=35 for Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Both CEO compensation
compared to the second-highest-paid executive and CEO breadth of education (i.e.,
number of unique fields of study) were related to humility in the hypothesized direction
(r=-.154 and r=.124). While correlations of .124 and .154 may appear insufficient to
consider the indicators to be acceptable proxies for the humility construct, validation
studies in the non-executive arena showed similar correlations (using larger samples), and
those fairly weak correlations were taken as evidence that the indicators were acceptable
proxy variables. For example, Pennebaker and King (1999) found significant correlations
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ranging from .07 and .16 between language use and self-reported personality measures,
and they concluded that language use is a meaningful way of exploring personality.
While CEO breadth of education and compensation ratio are, at best, imperfect proxies
for self-reported humility, the magnitude of the correlations found is similar to other
validation studies. It would be interesting to see if these two indicators become
significant with a larger validation sample.
Another limitation of this study stands from the nature of the validation sample
itself – CEOs of privately-owned companies of diverse sizes and operating in several
different industries. Considering secondary data was not available for these CEOs, items
were developed to compensate for the lack of publicly-available information. For
example, they were asked how "diverse" their top management team was in terms of
educational background, which could have been interpreted in different ways by
respondents. Such a perceptual measure of TMT diversity might not be a good proxy for
the more traditional TMT diversity index, which is based on an objective algorithm (i.e.,
Blau Index) that uses secondary data on the educational backgrounds of the different
TMT members.
The nature of the validation sample was also suboptimal to validate the indicator
relative to the CEO compensation compared to that of the second-highest-paid executive.
First, 60% of our sample were CEO/founders which may have important compensation
implications. In addition, the CEOs operated in very different industries (e.g., IT
consulting vs. transportation vs. plumbing). Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found a
significant positive correlation between CEO compensation compared to the secondhighest-paid executive and narcissism with a sample encompassing CEOs of publicly-
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traded companies exclusively in the computer hardware and software industries.
Similarly, when analyzing only highly similar firms in my sample (i.e., 12 IT consulting
firms from Canada), I found a correlation of .611 (p<.05) between CEO total
compensation compared to that of the second-highest-executive and narcissism. The
same relationship was not significant when I included all 30 firms. Thus a more
homogeneous sample of firms in terms of industries/contexts would have been more
adequate to validate the relative compensation indicator.
Lastly, I examined how range restriction and social desirability may have
impacted my results. One could argue that humble CEOs are more likely to agree to
participate in research studies – suggesting a potential range restriction. When comparing
my results to Ou and colleagues (2014), both the mean humility scores and standard
deviations (S.D.) are very similar (mean = 4.47 and S.D. = .5 for Ou and colleagues
versus mean = 4.35 and S.D.= .36 in this study). While my results (both mean and S.D.)
are comparable to those of Ou and colleagues (2014), it does not rule out the possibility
that both study samples were biased toward more humble CEOs. If my sample is in fact
characterized by a restriction in range, it suggests the results presented here are
conservative estimates of the relationships between the proposed unobtrusive indicators
and self-reported humility – potentially hindering my ability to detect true effects.
When completing the self-reported measure of humility, CEOs might have been
influenced by social desirability. As mentioned previously, the mean for the humility
scale was fairly high (4.35 for the four dimension scale and 4.5 for the three dimension
scale) and the standard deviations were low (.36 for the four dimension scale and .41 for
the three dimension scale). However, the narcissism scores – another sensitive trait –
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showed great variability (mean=.32 and S.D. = .19) suggesting the humility scale may
need refinement. The development of a self-reported measure of humility based on
"forced-choices" as opposed to "likert items" may be a superior alternative to mitigate the
threat of social desirability – the use of forced-choice items has been argued to be an
effective coping strategy to reduce the threat of social desirability (Nederhof, 1985).
An avenue for future research would be to examine the relationships between the
suggested unobtrusive indicators and other-reported measures of CEO humility. Ou
(2011) measured humility using both a self-reported measure and other-reported measure
(same items) and found weak to moderate correlations between the two on the different
dimensions (Self-Awareness r=.37, p<.01; Appreciation of Others r=.34, p<.01;
Teachability r=.32, p<.01; Low Self-Focus r=.25, p<.01). Potentially self-reported
measures and other-reported measures capture something slightly different and some of
the unobtrusive indicators may show higher correlations with other-reported scores.
To conclude, both CEO involvement in non-profits and CEO acknowledgement
of the importance of other stakeholders to firm success appear to be significantly related
to self-reported humility. Board memberships on non-profits for CEOs of publicly-traded
companies can be found online and in different databases, and content analysis of letters
to shareholders may be used to assess CEOs acknowledgment of the importance of other
stakeholders. While these two indicators represent interesting opportunities for Upper
Echelons scholars who are interested in the strategic implications of CEO humility, more
validation is needed for the other potential unobtrusive indicators.
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III. Strategic Implications of CEO Humility
Abstract
Using the unobtrusive indicators of humility described in essay two, this study
empirically tested the strategic implications of CEO humility on a set of objective
organizational-level outcomes, namely corporate social performance, R&D spending,
firm performance, and firm market valuation. Based on a sample of 163 CEOs appointed
to S&P 500 firms between 2005-2008, results suggested that firms led by humble CEOs
tend to outperform others in regards to corporate social performance (KLD strengths),
but that their financial performance (ROA) is generally no better or worse. Findings for
R&D spending were mixed – while the individual humility unobtrusive indicators were
not significantly related to R&D spending (with the exception of the CEO’s
acknowledgement of the importance of other stakeholders to firm success in letters to
shareholders), the overall CEO humility index was positively related to R&D spending.
Lastly, results provided preliminary evidence that firms led by humble CEOs tend to be
undervalued by the market. The implications of my findings for Upper Echelons theory,
and more specifically the influence of CEOs views of self on organizational outcomes are
discussed.

Introduction
Over the past several decades, Upper Echelons theorists have examined the
impact of top executives' individual differences on different organizational outcomes.
Whereas in its early stages, the focus was mainly on observable demographic
characteristics, recently work has encompassed a whole host of personality
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characteristics. For example, CEOs personality attributes such as hubris (Hayward,
Hambrick, 1997; Li & Tang, 2010; Tang, Qian, Chen, & Shen, 2014), core selfevaluations (CSE) (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller,
2009; Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010), narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007;
Resick et al., 2009), locus of control (e.g., Miller & Toulouse, 1986a;
1986b; Sidek & Zainol, 2011; Van de Ven, Hudson, & Schroeder, 1984), and the Big 5
(Giberson et al., 2009; Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010; Peterson, Smith, Martorana, &
Owens, 2003) were all found to be predictive of different strategic outcomes.
In the past 10 years, the strategic implications of CEOs' views of self has become
a prominent topic among Upper Echelons scholars. Several empirical studies have been
conducted to examine "how" (and sometimes "when") CEOs self-views impact firms'
behaviors and strategies, and how it may, in turn, predict lower or higher performance
levels (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Resick et al., 2009, Li & Tang, 2010). Most
research thus far has attempted to answer these questions by focusing on what might be
considered the "high" end of the CEO self-concept personality dimensions, namely
narcissism, hubris, CSE, and overconfidence.
In this study, I focus on a self-concept personality trait that has received
considerably less attention – humility. The dearth of studies on CEO humility is quite
surprising considering scholars have recently suggested that due to the complex nature of
today's organizations, CEOs must avoid monologues, learn from others, and surround
themselves with talented others – all are key components of recent definitions of humility
(Drucker, 1992; Ou et al., 2014; Weick, 2001).
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Ou and colleagues (2014) was the first empirical paper to examine humility at the
CEO-level. Their study revealed the impact humble CEOs have on team processes (e.g.,
TMT integration) and employee-level outcomes (e.g., middle managers' work
engagement, affective commitment, and job performance). In this essay, I chose to study
the impact humble CEOs have on objective organizational outcomes since CEOs are a
rare case where an individual's idiosyncrasies shows-up in firm-level outcomes. Thus,
this essay represents a first attempt at eliciting the impact humble CEOs have on their
organizations (and more objective strategic outcomes). More specifically, I examine the
influence of humble CEOs on corporate social responsibility, R&D spending, firm
performance (i.e., ROA), and firm market valuation (i.e., Tobin's Q).

Theoretical Background
In the last three decades, the Upper Echelons Perspective has been the main
theoretical lens used by scholars to understand the influence of executives’ personality on
organizational outcomes. Originally articulated by Hambrick and Mason (1984), the
Upper Echelons Perspective suggests that organizational outcomes (e.g., strategic
choices, structure, culture, performance, etc.) can be at least partially predicted by top
executives’ prior experiences, demographics, values, and personality characteristics. In
other words, it proposes that one way to better comprehend organizational strategies is to
examine the individual characteristics of the top executives who make strategic decisions
on behalf of their firms (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). On a daily basis, top
executives deal with an influx of ambiguous and sometimes contradictory information
and the manner in which executives select, comprehend, and interpret this information is
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highly dependent on their prior experiences, values, demographics, and psychological
factors (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Thus, top executives make decisions
based on a highly filtered, personalized, idiosyncratic understanding of the situations they
are in, instead of following a perfectly rational algorithm that would weigh all relevant
information (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In sum, CEOs' idiosyncrasies
influence the way they construe the reality of strategic situations and evaluate different
strategic options, and also explain their dispositions toward certain strategic choices
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).
Although in its original development, the Upper Echelons Perspective referred to
the entire top management team (TMT), most of the empirical work on individual
differences has been conducted at the CEO-level (Hiller & Beauchesne, 2014). Strategy
scholars have asserted that CEOs in particular greatly influence the strategic direction and
performance of their organizations (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Peterson et al., 2003). For
example, Hambrick (1994) highly criticized studies considering the CEO as just another
member of the top management team. He argued that CEOs have a disproportionate and
often dominating influence on their firms, thus suggesting that their individual
differences can greatly affect the firm’s behaviors and performance levels. Consistent
with this view, this study focuses on humility at the CEO-level.

CEO Humility and Corporate Social Performance
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as a "firm's configuration of
principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies,
programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships"

67

(Wood, 1991, p.693). In other words, it represents how effectively firms meet the
expectations of their different societal stakeholders such as local communities,
employees, natural environment, etc. Scholars have devoted a lot of attention to
understanding the delicate interplay between CSR and firm performance, and the findings
have generally supported a positive association between CSR and firms' long-term
financial performance (Berman et al., 1999; Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010;
Muller & Kraussl, 2011; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Wang & Qian, 2011).
While there has been considerable empirical research on the firm-level
antecedents of poorly and strongly socially performing firms and its consequences on
firm performance, we still have a limited knowledge on the influence of top executives'
idiosyncrasies on the firm’s socially responsible behaviors (Manner, 2010). This is
somehow surprising considering corporate leaders have the ultimate say over the strategic
approaches firms undertake with respect to corporate social responsibility (Davis, 1973).
Research on how executives influence CSR has focused largely on demographic
characteristics, past experiences and compensation (Tang, Qian, Chen, & Shen, 2014).
For instance, using a sample of 650 publicly-traded companies, Manner (2010) found that
female CEOs with degrees in humanities and a breadth of career experiences were more
likely to encourage CSR initiatives. Based on a sample of 392 CEOs of S&P 500
companies, Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2009) found CEO international experience to be
positively related to corporate social performance (CSP). Researchers have also
examined the influence of CEO tenure and compensation on CSR. For example, Deckop,
Merriman, and Gupta (2006) found that short-term CEO pay focus was negatively
correlated with CSR. Similarly, CEOs approaching retirement (which are also likely to
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have a shorter-term focus) were found to pay less attention to social issues and engaged
in less CSR initiatives.
While we have growing evidence that the CEOs' characteristics listed above are
predictive of corporate social performance, less is known in regards to the influence
CEOs' psychological biases and values have on their firms' engagement toward social
issues. Corporate leaders face growing demands to manage both profit and social
responsibility (Waddock & Graves, 1997). How they manage those two, sometimes
conflicting, objectives is likely to be indicative of their personality and values (Chin,
Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013). Two recent studies have started investigating this question.
First, Chin and colleagues (2013) examined the impact of CEOs' political values (i.e.,
liberal vs. conservative) on corporate social performance, and found empirical evidence
that liberal CEOs emphasize CSR more than conservative CEOs. Second, Tang and
colleagues (2014) found that hubristic CEOs (who tend to believe firm success depends
more on them than other stakeholders) are less likely to influence their firms toward
engaging in socially responsible activities.
Below, I argue CEO humility appears to be an important psychological
characteristic to study in the context of CSR. First, humble CEOs' low self-focus leads
them to seek the good of the collective above self-interests (Owens, 2009). For publiclytraded firms, the CEOs best interests would be to make strategic decisions which quickly
impact their companies' bottom line, making sure board members are satisfied with their
work in order to secure their jobs (Erickson & Jacobson, 1992). Alternatively, CEOs who
value collective interests are more likely to engage in strategic actions that benefit all
stakeholders. Such types of actions are the heart of what is considered CSR.
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In addition, humble CEOs do not seek immediate personal glory and public
attention (Rowatt et al., 2006), which is likely to translate into a longer-term focus. CSR
has been found to be positively associated with an array of long-term positive outcomes
for firms: superior firm financial performance (Berman et al., 1999; Lev, Petrovits, &
Radhakrishnan, 2010; Muller & Kraussl, 2011; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Wang & Qian,
2011), improved firm reputation (Turban & Greening, 1996), enhanced firm legitimacy
(Handelman & Arnold, 1999), development of organizational capabilities (Sharma &
Vredenburg, 1998), and improved perception of firm as being ethical (Valentine &
Fleischman, 2008). As such, CSR initiatives are likely to be privileged by CEOs with a
longer-term orientation. Characterized as having a longer-term focus, humble CEOs will
value strategic initiatives that contribute to the long-term viability of their firms as
opposed to short-term, profit-maximizing decisions, which could be detrimental in the
long-run.
In sum, considering their stakeholder orientation, and long-term focus, humble
CEOs will influence their organizations toward engaging in more socially responsible
initiatives. Hence, I anticipate that:
Hypothesis 1: CEO humility will be positively associated with CSP.

CEO Humility and Firm R&D Spending
Spending money on research and development (R&D) is one of the most
important strategic decisions firms have to make (Barker & Mueller, 2002). Considering
how central firm R&D spending is to firms' continuing success, scholars have devoted a
lot of attention to understanding its antecedents. Traditional research on the topic has
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mainly focused on firm- and industry-level determinants, often omitting the attributes of
top executives as potential antecedents (Barker & Mueller, 2002). For example, firms'
industry (e.g., Sherer, 1984), corporate strategy (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989;
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988), board member characteristics (Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman,
2011), and institutional investors (David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001) are some of the
numerous factors that have been found to influence firms' R&D spending.
Most of the existing research on the influence of top executives' individual
differences in regards to firms' R&D spending has focused on CEOs visible
characteristics (e.g., demographics, prior experiences, etc.). Barker and Mueller (2002)
found that a CEO's age, functional background and stock ownership were predictive of
firm R&D spending even after controlling for traditional firm- and industry-level
antecedents. Firms led by CEOs who were younger, had more wealth invested in
company stock, and had previous experiences in marketing, R&D and/or engineering also
showed greater R&D spending. Similarly, Thomas, Litschert, and Ramaswamy (1991)
found, using a sample in the computer industry, that firms following market innovation
strategies were likely to be led by younger and more educated CEOs. More recently, Lin,
Lin, Song and Li (2011) found that CEOs' educational level, political connections, and
performance-driven compensation all predicted greater levels of R&D spending in the
context of manufacturing firms in China.
In addition to observing the impact of CEOs' visible characteristics on firms'
R&D spending, a few studies have looked at CEOs' personality and its relationship with
firm innovation (although innovation was not always operationalized as firm R&D
spending). For example, using self-reported surveys, Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulouse
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(1982) found that firms led by CEOs with an internal locus of control engaged in more
product-market innovation. More recently, using patent data, Tang, Li and Yang (2012)
found that CEO hubris was positively related to firm innovation. The authors argued that
hubristic CEOs influence their firms towards engaging in more innovative projects since
it is consistent with their self-aggrandizing nature and belief they can achieve miracles.
I argue that CEO humility is another psychological characteristic that is likely to
have critical implications in regard to firm R&D spending. First, firm investment in
developing new products, technologies or processes is a key determinant of long-term
productivity and competitive advantage (Scherer, 1984; Ettlie, 1998). As such, investing
in R&D is considered a long-term strategic investment (Eberhart, Maxwell, & Siddique,
2004) and it has been found to be predictive of subsequent growth in both sales (Morbey,
1988) and long-term abnormal operating performance (Eberhart et al., 2004). The shortterm focus of some organizations is one reason why some firms do not make the
necessary investments in R&D (Erickson & Jacobson, 1992). In order to keep their job,
CEOs of publicly-traded firms are encouraged to adopt a current-quarter style of
management in response to the stock market requirements (Erickson & Jacobson, 1992).
R&D spending often negatively impacts current quarter earnings (Erickson & Jacobson,
1992), which may dissuades shorter-term focused CEOs from engaging in such type of
investment.
As discussed previously, humble CEOs are not looking for immediate glory or
public adulation – allowing them to have a longer-term orientation when deciding what is
best for their organizations. Their low self-focus and collective orientation is likely to
translate into strategic actions that positively impact the long-term viability of their firms
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in contrast with short-term decisions that would bring them into the spotlight and ensure
their job, but potentially be detrimental to their organizations' continuing success.
In addition, humble CEOs are also characterized by an openness to learn which
translates into an openness to new ideas, feedback and information (Owens, 2009;
Tangney, 2000). Investing in R&D clearly demonstrates an organization's desire to
constantly learn and improve its processes and products. I argue humble CEOs will
prioritize such investments since it is consistent with their personal preference for
continual development and improvement. In sum, considering their long-term orientation
and openness to new ideas, combined with their preference for continual improvement
and learning, humble CEOs should influence their firms toward greater R&D spending.
Hence, I anticipate that:
Hypothesis 2: CEO humility will be positively associated with firm R&D spending.

CEO Humility and Firm Performance
Firm performance represents a broad category of organizational outcomes, which
has received considerable attention in the Upper Echelons literature. Scholars have
studied the impact of CEOs' individual differences both directly with organizational
performance and through mediating mechanisms such as company strategy, structure, etc
(Hiller & Beauchesne, 2014). Considering how distal firm performance is from CEOs'
individual differences, it has been argued that CEOs' characteristics better predict more
proximal outcomes such as firms' strategies and culture (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
While Upper Echelons studies have largely focused on more proximal outcomes,
a review of the literature shows that a number of studies found significant relationships
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between CEOs' characteristics and firm performance measures (Hiller, Beauchesne, &
Whitman, 2013). For example, using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, CEO
narcissism was found to be positively associated with Earnings-Per-Share (Olsen,
Dworkis, & Young, 2013). They argued that this relationship may be due to the fact that
the qualities associated with narcissistic tendencies led to better performance by CEOs
and/or that more narcissistic CEOs took advantage of the subjectivity and ambiguity in
financial accounting to paint a rosier picture of their financial performance – which
allowed them to receive attention and praise. Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007) also studied
the impact of narcissistic CEOs on firm performance. While they did not find CEO
narcissism to be predictive of firm performance average, it was found to predict
fluctuations in performance – firms led by narcissistic CEOs showed more extreme
performance levels (ROA and TSR). In another study, CEO tenure was found to
positively predict firm performance (i.e., ROA, ROIC, and ROS) in stable industries,
whereas it was negatively related to performance in more dynamic industries (Henderson,
Miller, & Hambrick, 2006). They argued that in dynamic industries, CEOs' paradigms
grow obsolete faster than they could learn which led to lower performance for longertenured CEOs.
In a recent meta-analysis, Hiller, Beauchesne and Whitman (2013) found
significant positive true score correlations between accounting measures of performance
and CEO openness (ρ=.30), CEO CSE (ρ=.18), and CEO internal locus of control
(ρ=.23). Although these results need to be interpreted carefully considering the small
number of studies included in the analyses, it does suggest that CEO characteristics may
have a sizeable impact on distal outcomes such as accounting measures of performance.
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In this section, I argue that CEO humility is another personality characteristic that
may have important implications for firm performance. Due to both their accurate selfassessment of personal strengths and weaknesses and their appreciation for others'
talents, humble CEOs are more likely to surround themselves with complimentary and
highly successful executives (Tjan, 2012). Ancona, Malone, Orlikowski, and Senge
(2007) suggested that only leaders who are aware of both their strengths and weaknesses
(i.e., aware of their own limitations) would be able to counterbalance their missing skills
by relying on others. Humble CEOs’ open attitude to others' ideas will encourage
dialogues among TMT members to reach successful decisions. For example, Ou and
colleagues (2014) found that CEO humility was positively related to TMT integration –
the level of collaborative behavior, the quantity and quality of information exchanged,
and the emphasis on joint decision-making within the TMT (Hambrick, 1994). In a
different study, Carmeli (2008) found that TMT integration was positively associated
with a perceptual measure of firm economic performance. The capacity of humble CEOs
to listen and learn from others is key to leading large complex organizations, since one
individual cannot possess all the resources needed to make every decision in such context
(Ireland & Hitt, 1999).
Humble CEOs are also characterized by their openness to learn which is critical to
successful leadership in an increasingly complex and interconnected business
environment (Ou, 2011). One of the most often cited functions of CEOs is their boundary
spanning responsibility (Jacobs & Jaques, 1987; Katz & Kahn, 1978). In order to ensure a
constant adaptation of their organizations with the broader environment (i.e., boundary
spanning), CEOs must be willing and capable to learn and adapt to varying situations.
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Humble CEOs who are described as open to new ideas, ways of doing things and
feedback (Owens, 2009) are likely to be successful when operating in changing
environments.
Humble individuals are also characterized as having a low self-focus. Thus,
humble CEOs will keep in mind the best interests of the organization they lead and the
larger community as opposed to pursuing self-interested motives (Owens, 2009). They
will pursue strategies that best fit their organizations' needs, regardless of the immediate
impact on their popularity. As argued previously, if it is not in the long-term best interests
of their company, humble CEOs will not make grandiose risky decisions to get the
attention and admiration of the public. In light of all the aforementioned arguments, I
forsee that firms led by humble CEOs will generally outperform those led by less humble
CEOs. Hence, I anticipate that:
Hypothesis 3: CEO humility will be positively associated with firm performance.

CEO Humility and Firm Market Valuation
Tobin's Q, a financial, market-based measure of performance, is defined as the
ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its assets (Lindberg & Ross,
1981). A Tobin's Q value above one, means that the firm has a market value that is
greater than the value of the company's recorded assets. Ratios above one are interpreted
as a sign of unmeasured source of value, which is generally attributed to intangible value
possessed by the firm (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, & Konsynski, 1999). Alternatively, Qratio below one suggests the market is undervaluing the company.
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The value added by the top management of an organization is considered an
important intangible asset captured by Tobin's Q (Huselid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997).
Considering CEOs are the most visible and scrutinized human resource a firm has, their
behaviors are likely to impact how their firms are perceived and consequently, valued by
the market. I argue that CEO humility is an important characteristic to study in regard to
firms' market valuation. Humble CEOs, characterized as having a low self-focus (Ou et
al., 2014; Owens, 2009; Tangney, 2002), are less likely to be highly visible in the media,
which may in turn contribute to building less publicity for their companies. In addition, as
argued previously, humble CEOs are more likely to have a stakeholder orientation – they
are interested in the long-term viability of their firm and creating value for all
stakeholders, not only pleasing shareholders. In sum, considering humble CEOs are less
likely to be out in the media boasting the success of their organizations, and following the
argument that they have more of a stakeholder orientation, I expect that firms led by
humble CEOs will have lower Tobin's Q ratio. Hence, I anticipate that:
Hypothesis 4: CEO humility will be negatively associated with a firm's market valuation

Methodology
Sample
The different hypotheses were tested using a sample of U.S. CEOs appointed to
S&P 500 firms between 2005-2008. S&P 500 firms represent a wide array of industries,
thus I expect findings to show a high degree of external validity. CEOs appointed to S&P
500 firms during that time period were initially identified, but only those with at least
three years of tenure within the study period were included. CEOs with less than three
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years of tenure were eliminated considering the humility indicators were measured on the
second and third year of CEO tenure. The search generated a total of 163 CEOs (all from
different firms).
CEO humility indicators were measured on the second and third year of CEO
tenure (i.e., average of the two years). The first year was eliminated due to potential
anomalies resulting from the succession event (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Consistent
with the stable nature of personality, CEO humility scores on the different indicators
were invariant (i.e., based on humility scores measured on years two and three).
Alternatively, the dependent variables (i.e., CSP, R&D spending, ROA, and Tobin's Q)
were measured each year starting on the second year of the CEO’s tenure. Data for R&D
spending, ROA, and Tobin's Q were collected up to 2013. While data on CSR was only
available to the author until 2009, resulting in a smaller dataset to test the CSR
hypothesis. As a result, empirical analyses were conducted using a firm-year structure.

Independent Variables
The unobtrusive humility indicators described in essay two were used for the
different analyses. In the first set of analyses, humility indicators were entered
individually in the different regressions. Considering some of the proposed humility
indicators overlap conceptually, and in order to minimize multicollinearity, six indicators
were selected: CEOs' board membership on non-profits, CEOs' breadth of studies, TMT
educational diversity, CEO compensation ratios (cash and non-cash), and CEOs'
acknowledgement of the importance of other stakeholders in the letters to shareholders.
These six indicators were chosen since they conceptually best capture the four
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dimensions of humility: teachability/openness to learn (CEOs' breadth of studies), selfawareness (TMT educational diversity), appreciation of others' strengths (CEOs'
acknowledgement of the importance of other stakeholders), and low self-focus (CEO
compensation ratio and CEOs' board membership on non-profits).
The other proposed indicators (i.e., CEO career variety, CEO educational level,
size of the CEO picture in annual reports, and functional diversity) were not included in
the regressions. CEO educational level was excluded since it was found to be highly
correlated with CEOs' breadth of studies (r=.64). Similarly, TMT functional diversity was
not included since it was correlated with TMT educational diversity (r=.38), and both
variables greatly overlap conceptually. Used previously as a proxy for narcissism, the
size of CEOs' photographs in annual reports was excluded given that the low self-focus
component of humility was already captured by CEOs' compensation ratio (also used
previously as a measure of narcissism). Lastly, CEO career variety was excluded as a
variable because essay two suggests that it is a better indicator of openness to experience.
For the second set of regressions, a humility index was created based on the same
unobtrusive indicators: breadth of education, board membership on non-profits, TMT
educational diversity, CEO relative compensation, and acknowledgement of the work of
others in letters to shareholders. The index was calculated as the simple mean of the
different measures, after standardization, for each CEO. As a test of coherence among the
different indicators, I performed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (see Figure 9). The
CFA showed weak standardized coefficients and the model goodness of fit indices were
below acceptance levels (CFI=.683 and RMSEA= .084) (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu &
Bentler, 1998). In addition, I calculated the Cronbach alpha for the standardized values of
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all five variables. The alpha was .16, which is considerably below the threshold (.70) to
form a new reflective index (Nunnally, 1978). The weak correlations among the different
proposed humility unobtrusive indicators may be partly explained by the multi-faceted
nature of the humility construct, that suggests it is best represented as a formative
construct – the proposed indicators potentially capturing the different sub-dimensions of
humility. Using the formative approach, indicators can be combined to form a new
construct without any assumptions as to the patterns of inter-correlations among them
(Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001). In this case, each unobtrusive indicator may be
capturing a slightly different conceptual domain of the overarching humility construct.
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Figure 9: Confirmatory Factor Analysis - Unobtrusive Indicators

Dependent Variables
The corporate social performance measure included KLD Research & Analytics,
Inc. (KLD) ratings on five dimensions: community, diversity, employee relations,
environmental impact, and product safety and quality. These dimensions were chosen
since they best represent the stakeholder orientation of CSP (Agle, Mitchell, &
Sonnenfeld, 1999). Prior work has suggested corporate leaders' beliefs impact strong
(i.e., proactive) CSP more than avoidance of poor CSP (Manner, 2010). Thus, CSP was
operationalized as a firm's total number of strengths on the five dimensions. R&D
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spending was operationalized as the total dollars spent in R&D divided by the total
number of employees (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Baysinger et al., 1991; Hill & Snell,
1989; Scherer, 1984). Firm performance was operationalized using return on assets
(ROA), calculated as the net income divided by assets (minus the industry median ROA
based on 2-digit SIC codes) (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Lastly, firm market
valuation was operationalized using Tobin's Q (Chung & Pruitt, 1994) – Tobin's Q
represents a firm's total market value divided by its total asset value. I subtracted the
industry median Tobin's Q from each firm/year Tobin's Q ratio (based on 2-digit SIC
codes). Industry ROA and Tobin's Q medians were preferred to means since they are
much less affected by outliers. In addition, for all dependent variables, outliers (i.e., all
measures with standardized values greater than 3.29) were excluded from the different
analyses.

Control Variables
Control variables at the CEO-, firm-, and industry- levels were included in the
different regression models. Firm size, operationalized as the total number of employees,
was included in all models. Prior year performance, operationalized as a firm prior year
ROA, was also included in the analyses. Industry dummies were created based on the
first two digits of the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Industry dummies
were only included in the CSR and R&D spending regressions considering both the ROA
and Tobin's Q dependent variables were already adjusted for industry effects. CEO age
was controlled for in the different R&D, ROA, and Tobin's Q regression models.
Previous studies have found CEO age to be related to lower levels of innovation (e.g.,
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Barker & Mueller, 2002; Thomas et al., 1991), and CEO age is traditionally included in
models predicting firm performance (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Olsen et al.,
2013). CEO tenure was omitted in final regressions since it was not significant in any of
the models.

Data Sources
Humility indicators were coded based on information contained in varied sources:
company's annual reports, COMPUSTAT, Bloomberg database, and executive profiles
(Forbes and Bloomberg Businessweek). Consistent with recent empirical work (Agle et
al., 1999; Bernan et al., 1999; Coombs & Gilley, 2005; Graves & Waddock, 1994;
Manner, 2010; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009), CSR data
was collected from the KLD database. R&D spending, ROA, Tobin's Q, and the control
variables were obtained via COMPUSTAT.

Statistical Analyses
Considering the nature of the dataset (i.e., multiple observations for all firms in
the sample), generalized estimating equations (GEE) were used. GEE derive maximum
likelihood estimates and take into account the use of non-independent observations
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). For the CSR analyses, since my dependent variable is a
count variable (i.e., total strengths), a Poisson distribution was used. For the analyses
relative to R&D spending, ROA and Tobins' Q (which are all continuous variables),
normal distributions were used.
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Results
Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the
variables in the study. Table 4 shows the GEE results for the effects of the different
humility indicators on CSP. For each dependant variable, two models are presented: the
first model exclusively includes the control variables, whereas the full model adds the
main effects (i.e., the CEO unobtrusive humility indicators). Hypothesis 1 suggested
CEO humility would be positively associated to firm social performance, four out of the
six proposed humility indicators were related to CSP in the hypothesized direction (i.e.,
CEO board membership on non-profits, p<.10; CEO breadth of education, p<.05, TMT
educational diversity, p<.01; CEO non-cash pay ratio, p<.05), providing preliminary
support for hypothesis 1. In addition, after controlling for firm size and prior year ROA,
Table 8 shows that the overall CEO humility index is positively related to CSP (p<.05),
adding additional support to hypothesis 1.
Table 5 shows the GEE results for the test of the relationship between the CEO
humility indicators and firm R&D spending. Hypothesis 2 suggested CEO humility
would be positively related to firm R&D spending. Only one indicator out of the six (i.e.,
CEOs' acknowledgement of the importance of other stakeholders to firm success in
letters to shareholders, p<.10) was related to firm R&D spending in the hypothesized
direction, providing minimal support for hypothesis 2. However, Table 8 shows that the
overall CEO humility index is related to firm R&D spending in the hypothesized
direction (p<.05), providing some support for hypothesis 2. Additional research is needed
to untangle the mixed findings.

84

Table 6 shows the GEE results for the test of the relationship between the CEO
humility indicators and firm performance (operationalized as ROA). Hypothesis 3
suggested CEO humility would be positively related to firm performance. Of the
proposed humility indicators, none were found to be related to ROA in the hypothesized
direction, providing no support for hypothesis 3. Similar results were found using the
CEO humility index (Table 8).
Lastly, Table 7 presents the results for the impact of CEO humility on firm market
valuation. Hypothesis 4 suggested CEO humility would be negatively related to firm
market valuation. Three out of the six indicators entered in the regression were found to
be significant (i.e., CEO breadth of education, p<.05; CEO non-cash pay ratio, p<.01;
CEOs' acknowledgement of the importance of other stakeholders to firm success in
letters to shareholders, p<.05). In addition, Table 8 shows that the CEO humility index is
significantly related to firm market valuation in the hypothesized direction (p<.05),
providing additional support for hypothesis 4.
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Table 3: Main Study Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Mean

S.D.

1

1. Humility Index

Variables

.004

.482

1

2

3

4

5

6

2. CEO Board – Non Profit

.459

.499

.613**

1

3. CEO Breadth of Education

1.343

.600

.502**

.206**

1

4. CEO Career Variety

.228

.100

.067*

-.139**

.105**

1

5. CEO Cash Pay Ratio

1.633

.552

-.243**

-.144**

-.099**

.018

1

6. CEO Non-Cash Pay Ratio
7. CEO Importance Other
Stakeholders (ordinal)
8. CEO Education Level

2.075

1.651

.046

-.061

.055

.196**

.259**

1

1.561

.539

.449**

.088**

-.028

.269**

-.008

.007

4.665

.882

.335**

.164**

.636**

.256**

-.045

.164**

.047

1

9. CEO Photograph Size

2.543

.897

-.066

-.078*

-.096**

.004

-.178**

-.009

-.039

-.145**

**

**

**

8

9

10

11

12

13

1
1

10. TMT Educational Diversity

.504

.160

.404

.034

.008

-.014

.149

.003

.000

-.048

1

11. TMT Functional Diversity

.724

.093

.087**

-.004

.099**

.045

.162**

.170**

-.113**

.073*

-.150**

.382**

1

12. CSR Strengths

3.537

3.468

.146**

.128**

.169**

-.040

.114*

-.085

-.080

.144**

-.022

.188**

.171**

1

13. CSR Concerns

2.986

2.526

.268**

.193**

.178**

-.061

.099*

-.035

.133**

.171**

-.241**

.129**

.011

.364**

1

14. CSR Overall

.551

3.467

-.049

-.012

.040

.005

.041

-.059

-.178**

.019

.153**

.095

.164**

.735**

-.364**

24.407

39.629

.105*

-.131**

.065

.153**

-.100*

.021

-.014

.107*

.084

.181**

.245**

.274**

-.075

.067

.058

-.131**

-.175**

-.120**

.013

.022

-.043

.009

-.032

-.017

.074*

.061

.049

-.122*

17. ROE

.058

.060

.065

-.018

-.009

-.093**

.056

.002

.050

-.020

-.105**

.151**

.008

.037

.036

18. Tobin's Q

1.854

.850

-.155**

-.106**

-.180**

.093**

-.095**

-.093**

-.072*

-.085*

.042

-.010

.127**

.040

-.259**

19. EPS

2.776

3.444

.063

.058

-.017

-.011

-.037

-.065

.092**

.076*

-.098**

.007

-.012

.051

.073

.045

.096

**

-.034

.027

-.018

-.049

-.043

.079*

.476**

.379**

15. R&D Spending
16. ROA

20. Firm Size (thousands employees)
21. Prior Year ROA

-.009

49.044

70.204

.035

.065

.084

-.090**

-.099**

-.066*

-.011

-.054

-.064

-.017

-.015

-.003

.048

.051

.060

-.075

**

**

.088**

-.591**

-.008

-.071*

-.106**

.074*

-.050

.151**

.032

.147**

.277**

.014

.054

.008

.011

.022

-.004

.033

-.011

-.007

-.003

.045

22. CEO Age

55.441

5.529

.156

23. CEO Tenure

3.668

2.021

-.012

.141

**

.160

7

.192

-.018
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Table 3: Main Study Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (cont.)
Variables
14. CSR Overall
15. R&D Spending
16. ROA
17. ROE
18. Tobin's Q
19. EPS
20. Firm Size (thousands employees)
21. Prior Year ROA
22. CEO Age
23. CEO Tenure

14
1
.330**
.140**
.011
.226**
-.002
.202**
.115*
-.055
-.035

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1
.036
-.154**
.178**
-.197**
-.225**
-.031
-.138**
.061

1
.471**
.703**
.372**
.026
.591**
-.059
-.008

1
-.044
.490**
.051
.177**
.034
.048

1
.164**
.014
.477**
-.135**
-.022

1
.046
.146**
-.026
.126**

1
.017
.022
.072*

1
-.045
-.010

1
-.150**

1

Note: (*) less than 0.05; (**) less than 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 4: Results of GEE Analysis of CEO Humility Unobtrusive Indicators and CSP
Model 1
Control Model
.166
(.28)

Variables
Industry 1

Model 2
Full Model
.109
(.35)

Industry 2

.335

(.21)

.207

(.26)

Industry 3

.477 ϯ

(.25)

.282

(.29)

Industry 4

.640*

(.28)

.192

(.31)

Industry 5

.122

(.24)

-.020

(.28)

Industry6

.088

(.29)

-.070

(.28)

Industry 7

.450*

(.19)

.064

(.25)

Industry 8

.046

(.24)

-.229

(.31)

Industry 9

.923**

(.27)

.339

(.38)

Firm Size (employees)

.006**

(.00)

.005**

(.00)

.599

(.75)

.881

(.63)

Prior Yr ROA
CEO Board – Non-Profit

.254 ϯ

(.15)

CEO Breadth of Education

.273 *

(.14)

TMT (Education) Diversity

1.484**

(.46)

CEO Cash Pay Ratio

.224 *

(.12)

CEO Non-Cash Pay Ratio

-.071 *

(.04)

CEO Importance Other Stakeholders (ordinal)
QICC

-.107
873.449

(.16)
776.599

(ϯ) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.1; (*) less than 0.05; (**) less than 0.01, N= 367 firm/yrs

Table 5: Results of GEE Analysis of CEO Humility Unobtrusive Indicators and R&D Spending
Model 1
Control Model
5.906
(8.66)

Model 2
Full Model
15.733
(10.38)

Industry 2

9.820

(8.27)

14.672

(11.31)

Industry 3

6.513

(8.33)

10.33

(10.57)

Industry 4

2.939

(4.95)

7.584

(9.62)

Variables
Industry 1

Industry 5

9.193

(7.13)

20.210ϯ

(11.79)

Industry6

-18.160

(12.24)

-15.815

(14.17)

Industry 7

15.591*

(7.74)

11.054

(10.37)

Industry 8

-42.269**

(14.68)

-45.230

(14.25)

Firm Size (employees)

-.049 ϯ

(.03)

-.049 ϯ

(.03)

Prior Yr ROA

-8.078

(45.14)

-5295

(48.43)

CEO Age

-.005

(.63)

-.091

(.69)
(6.38)

CEO Board – Non-Profit

5.623

CEO Breadth of Education

4.483

6.69

TMT (Education) Diversity

35.167

(28.02)

CEO Cash Pay Ratio

4.332

(6.42)

CEO Non-Cash Pay Ratio

.185

(1.64)

11.715 ϯ

(6.15)

CEO Importance Other Stakeholders (ordinal)
395949.426

QICC

359207.683

(ϯ) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.1; (*) less than 0.05; (**) less than 0.01, N= 436 firm/yrs
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Table 6: Results of GEE Analysis of CEO Humility Unobtrusive Indicators and ROA
Model 1

Model 2

Control Model

Full Model

Variables

Firm Size (employees)

.000**

(.00)

.000**

(.00)

Prior Yr ROA

.573**

(1.56)

.560**

(.11)

.001

(.00)

.001

(.00)

CEO Board – Non-Profit

-.019

(.01)

CEO Breadth of Education

.005

(.01)

TMT (Education) Diversity

.008

(.04)

CEO Cash Pay Ratio

.008

(.01)

CEO Non-Cash Pay Ratio

.000*

(.00)

CEO Importance Other Stakeholders (ordinal)

.004

(.01)

CEO Age

14.519

QICC

26.397

(ϯ) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.1; (*) less than 0.05; (**) less than 0.01, N= 828 firm/yrs

Table 7: Results of GEE Analysis of CEO Humility Index and Tobin's Q (adjusted)
Model 1

Model 2

Control Model

Full Model

Variables

Firm Size (employees)

.000

(.00)

.000

(.00)

5.787**

(1.56)

5.606**

(1.54)

-.019*

(.01)

-.017 ϯ

(.01)

CEO Board – Non-Profit

-.074

(.11)

CEO Breadth of Education

-.175*

(.09)

TMT (Education) Diversity

-.173

(.33)

CEO Cash Pay Ratio

-.071

(.10)

CEO Non-Cash Pay Ratio

.028**

(.01)

CEO Importance Other Stakeholders (ordinal)

-.197*

(.10)

Prior Yr ROA
CEO Age

533.541

QICC

512.934

(ϯ) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.1; (*) less than 0.05; (**) less than 0.01, N= 756 firm/yrs
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Table 8: Results of GEE Analysis of CEO Humility Index and DVs
Variables

CSR

R&D Spending

ROA

Tobin’s Q

Industry 1

.174

(.29)

15.045

(9.61)

Industry 2

.246

(.22)

14.476ϯ

(8.79)

Industry 3

.394

(.26)

8.336

(6.73)

Industry 4

.533ϯ

(.29)

4.823

(5.35)

Industry 5

.095

(.25)

18.466*

(8.31)

Industry 6

.036

(.28)

-12.699

(11.39)

Industry 7

.434*

(.22)

16.132*

(7.63)

Industry 8

-.109

(.27)

-42.13**

(13.12)

Industry 9

.790**

(.28)

Firm Size (employees)

.005**

(.00)

-.065*

(.03)

.000**

(.00)

.000

(.00)

Prior Yr ROA

.677

(.78)

-10.536

(46.50)

.567**

(.08)

5.788**

(1.54)

CEO Humility Index

.244*

19.100*

(9.03)

-.007

(.01)

-.329*

(.13)

QICC

(.11)

853.746

372115.215

14.523

526.111

(ϯ) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.1; (*) less than 0.05; (**) less than 0.01

Discussion and Conclusion
Research on the strategic implications of CEOs' views of self has received a lot of
attention in the Upper Echelons literature in the past 10 years. However, this literature
has disproportionally focused on the "high" end of the self-concept spectrum: narcissism,
CSE, overconfidence, and hubris. CEOs who think extremely highly of themselves were
found to engage in riskier strategies (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011), lead their
firms to experience more performance fluctuations (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), pay
higher premiums for acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), and show greater
Earnings-Per-Share (Olsen et al., 2013). This study adds to this body of literature by
examining the strategic implications of a different category of CEOs, the humble CEOs,
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who are characterized as having a balanced view of self, a developmental orientation, a
low self-focus, and an appreciation of others' contributions (Owens, 2009).
Using a longitudinal dataset of S&P 500 companies, I found evidence that humble
CEOs led firms to engage in more socially responsible initiatives. These findings provide
empirical support to Ou and colleagues' (2014) assertion that humble CEOs will be more
inclined to integrate the needs of all stakeholders, whereas less humble CEOs will be
more focus on economic outcomes. Considering the adoption of socially responsible
practices by firms has been found to be associated with their long-term sustainability
(Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010; Muller & Kraussl, 2011; Wang & Qian, 2011),
it suggests executive humility can truly benefit organizations in the long run. These
findings also contribute to the Upper Echelons literature since it is one of the first studies
to examine the impact of a CEO's view of self on social outcomes.
This study do not provide clear conclusions in regard to the influence humble
CEOs may have on a firm's level of R&D spending. While the proposed individual
humility indicators were not found to be significantly predictive of firm R&D spending
(at the exception of the CEO acknowledgement of the importance of other stakeholders in
letters to shareholders), the overall humility index was. Considering the indicators
included in the index conceptually capture different facets of humility, it could
potentially mean that the sub-dimensions of humility are not individually predictive of
firm R&D spending, but that humility as an overall construct is. These results should be
interpreted cautiously, and more research is needed to untangle the mixed findings.
Results did not confirm a relationship between CEO humility and firm
performance. These findings add to the growing evidence that CEOs' individual
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characteristics best predict more proximal outcomes, such as firm strategies and culture,
as opposed to more distal outcomes, such as firm performance (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
While this study is based on a sample of companies representing a wide variety of
industries, it would be interesting to examine if the firm performance hypothesis receives
more support using a sample of firms operating in high-discretion industries – industries
that are not highly regulated or constrained by their environments (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007).
This study also shows preliminary evidence that the market appears to undervalue
firms led by humble CEOs. Three out of the six partial humility indicators and the overall
humility index point in that direction. Taken together, results from hypotheses three and
four suggest firms led by humble CEOs do not perform better or worse, but the way they
are valued by the market differs. Humble CEOs are less likely to be highly visible and
hype their firm performance in the media, which potentially lead to lower market
valuations.
My results also suggest that CEO humility predicts a different set of outcome
variables than CEO narcissism. For example, CEO narcissism – measured using a
narcissism index based on three validated unobtrusive indicators (i.e., CEO relative cash
compensation, CEO relative non-cash compensation, and size of the CEO picture on
annual reports) – was not significantly predictive of corporate social performance.
Similarly, while the CEO humility index was found to be significantly negatively related
to firm market valuation, CEO narcissism showed no relationship with firm market
valuation. Together, these findings suggest CEO humility predicts a unique set of firmlevel outcomes and is not merely the low end of narcissism (i.e., antinarcissism). As such,

92

the inclusion of humility in the executive leadership literature appears critical to enrich
our understanding of the influence of CEO self-view on firms' behaviors.
Despite these contributions, this study has several limitations that should be
mentioned. First, the unobtrusive indicators were not all successfully validated in the
second study. Even though they appear conceptually related to humility (and its different
dimensions), only two of the indicators were found to be significantly related to selfreported humility (i.e., CEO board membership on non-profits and CEO
acknowledgement of the importance of other stakeholders to firm success). More
validation, preferably using other-reported measures of humility, is needed. While some
of the proposed indicators may not clearly capture CEO humility, the fact they have
predictive value is, in itself, quite fascinating. For example, CEO breadth of education
and CEO board membership on non-profits – two CEO characteristics which have never
been explored in the Upper Echelons literature – were found to be positively significantly
related to CSP.
The weak correlations found among the different humility indicators represent
another limitation of this study. Considering the correlations among the humility
indicators and Cronbach's alpha do not meet the suggested thresholds to form a new
index (Nunnally, 1978), results from the aggregated humility index need to be interpreted
cautiously. While the multi-faceted nature of the humility construct (i.e., formative
construct) potentially explains some of the weak observed inter-correlations among the
proposed humility indicators, it may also be that some of the indicators are not clearly
capturing CEO humility. While I cannot ascertain that the index clearly captures CEO
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humility, its different components (i.e., attributes and behaviors) appear to be collectively
predictive of different strategic outcomes (i.e., CSP, R&D spending, and firm valuation).
Another important consideration is the possibility of reverse causality. For
example, while we may expect humble CEOs to lead their organizations to greater social
performance, humble CEOs may also be drawn to socially responsible organizations
and/or socially responsible firms may be looking to hire CEOs with such profiles. As
suggested by Hambrick (2007), the use of panel data and temporal lags as opposed to
cross-sectional designs reduces the threat of reverse causality. For this study, dependent
variables were measured each year starting on the second year of the CEO’s tenure (i.e.,
one year lag). Alternatively, the CSR hypothesis was tested using a two-year lag (i.e.,
measuring CSR starting the third year of the CEO’s tenure) and the results remained
unchanged.
By integrating CEO humility to the literature on the strategic implications of
CEOs' views of self, this study leads to a host of additional research avenues. First, it
would be interesting to test similar hypotheses using a sample of firms in high-discretion
industries, similar to what has been done in CEO narcissism research (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007, 2011). CEOs' humble tendencies would likely have a greater impact in
such high-discretion contexts. My results also point to the possibility that humble CEOs
are more prevalent in some industries than others. Potentially, humble CEOs are drawn to
and/or are more likely to get hired in some industries than others. For example, it would
be interesting to test if humble CEOs are more prevalent in a people-focused industry
such as healthcare. In addition, CEO humility might influence other proximal outcomes
such as organizational ambidexterity – a firm's capacity to efficiently manage today's
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business demands, while also be adaptive to changes in its environment (Gibson &
Birkinshaw, 2004). Humble CEOs, who are characterized as having a learning
orientation, may be particularly skilled at helping their organizations balance operation
and exploitation. Lastly, it would be interesting to look at potential boundary conditions
of the relationships between CEO humility and organizational-level outcomes. Are
humble CEOs more effective in firms with participative cultures? Considering their
learning orientation, are humble CEOs a better fit in highly dynamic environments? Will
their cooperative approach to leadership and stakeholder orientation be considered too
soft during difficult financial times? Considering humble CEOs are more likely to listen
and include the input of other TMT members in their decisions, are the strategies of firms
led by humble CEOs more of a reflection of their entire TMTs, rather than their CEOs?
In sum, an abundant number of questions on the strategic implications of executive
humility awaits management scholars.
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Appendix A: Factor Loadings and Cronbach's Alphas for Each Dimension of Humility

Items

Cronbach's
Alpha

Self-Awareness

Self‐
Reported
Loading

.583

I1. I actively seek feedback, even if it is critical.

.67

I2. I acknowledge when others have more knowledge and skills

.78

than me.
I3. I admit when I don't know how to do something.
Appreciation of Others

.78
.693

I4. I show appreciation for the contributions of others.

.83

I5. I take notice of the strengths of others.

.61

I6. I often compliment others on their strengths.

.92

Teachability

.843

I7. I am willing to learn from others.

.86

I8.I am open to the ideas of others.

.86

I9. I am open to the advice of others.

.90

Low Self-Focus

.864

I10. I do not like to draw attention to myself.

.89

I11. I keep a low profile.

.89

I12. I am not interested in obtaining fame for myself.

.89
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Appendix B: Survey Introduction Letter

Dear (name of participant),
The Center for Leadership at Florida International University (FIU) is engaged in a
research study to understand how different CEOs operate and how personality impacts
strategy. This survey research is being conducted by Dr. Nathan J. Hiller and PhD
candidate Marie-Michèle Beauchesne.
If you choose to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a brief online survey. The survey
includes questions about yourself, your top management team and your organization. It will take no more
than 15 minutes of your time to complete. This survey is confidential and information about you or your
participation will never be revealed; only aggregate scores will be used in reporting findings. We will
provide participants with a report of our main findings following the completion of this research project. In
addition, we will award each participant in the survey a 2014 FIU Partner-in-Research Seal, which you
may display on your company website, e-mails, or stationery. This survey is computer-based and may be
accessed via the link at the end of this email.

If you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact Marie-Michele
Beauchesne at (914) 844-8213 or mbeauche@fiu.edu. To access the survey, please click
on the link below.

Thank you in advance for your participation in this research study!

Marie-Michele Beauchesne & Nathan J. Hiller
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Appendix C: Survey
Q1. Is your organization a:
 For-Profit
 Not-For-Profit
 Government
Q2. What is the primary industry of your organization? (If unsure, choose the "best fit")
 Basic Materials
 Consumer Goods
 Consumer Services
 Financials
 Health Care
 Industrials
 Oil & Gas
 Technology
 Telecommunications
 Utilities
 Other
Q3. What were the annual revenues of your organization in 2013?
 Less than $1.0M
 $1.0M - $4.9M
 $5.0M - $9.9M
 $10.0M - $24.9M
 $25.0M - $49.9M
 $50.0M - $99.9M
 $100.0M - $499.9M
 > $500.0M
Q4. How many employees are currently employed by your organization?
 1-9
 10-19
 20-49
 50-99
 100-499
 500-999
 1000-4999
 > 5000
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Q5. Below are several statements about yourself with which you may agree or disagree.
Using a 5-point scale, indicate your agreement or disagreement with each item.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

I actively seek
feedback, even
if it is critical.











I acknowledge
when others
have more
knowledge and
skills than me.











I admit when I
don't know how
to do
something.











I show
appreciation for
the
contributions of
others.











I take notice of
the strengths of
others.











I often
compliment
others on their
strengths.











I am willing to
learn from
others.











I am open to the
ideas of others.











I am open to the
advice of
others.











I do not like to
draw attention
to myself.











I keep a low
profile.











I am not
interested in
obtaining fame
for myself.
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Q6. I see myself as:
Strongly Agree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Extroverted,
enthusiastic.











Open to new
experiences,
complex.











Calm,
emotionally
stable.











Conventional,
uncreative.











Reserved, quiet.











Anxious, easily
upset.











Q7. Read each pair of statements below and check the statement that comes closest to
describing your feelings and beliefs about yourself. You may feel that neither statement
describes you well, but pick the one that comes closest. Please complete all pairs.

 I really like to be the center of attention
 It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention
 I am no better or no worse than most people
 I think I am a special person
 Everybody likes to hear my stories
 Sometimes I tell good stories
 I usually get the respect that I deserve
 I insist upon getting the respect that is due to me
 I don't mind following orders
 I like having authority over people
 I am going to be a great person
 I hope I am going to be successful
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 People sometimes believe what I tell them
 I can make anybody believe anything I want them to
 I expect a great deal from other people
 I like to do things for other people
 I like to be the center of attention
 I prefer to blend in with the crowd
 I am much like everybody else
 I am an extraordinary person
 I always know what I am doing
 Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing
 I don't like it when I find myself manipulating people
 I find it easy to manipulate people
 Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me
 People always seem to recognize my authority
 I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so
 When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed
 I try not to be a show off
 I am apt to show off if I get the chance
 I am more capable than other people
 There is a lot that I can learn from other people
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Q8. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
 Below high school
 High school
 Some college
 Bachelor's degree
 Master's degree
 Doctorate
Q9. In how many unique fields have you studied (e.g., an undergraduate degree in
engineering followed by an MBA would be "2", whereas an undergraduate degree in
business administration followed by an MBA would be "1")?
 1
 2
 3
 4 or more
Q10. Including your current company, how many organizations have you worked for since
you were 21 years old?
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7 or more
Q11. Throughout your career, the positions you have held fall into which of these functional
tracks? Check all that apply.
 Production/Operations
 R&D/Engineering
 Accounting/Finance
 Management/Administration
 Marketing/Sales
 Human Resources
 Law
 Other
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Q12. Throughout your career, in which of these industries have you worked in? Check all
that apply.
 Basic Materials
 Consumer Goods
 Consumer Services
 Financials
 Health Care
 Industrials
 Oil & Gas
 Technology
 Telecommunications
 Utilities
 Other
Q13. Do you hold both the titles of CEO and Chair of the board in your current
organization?
 Yes
 No
Q14. Are you a founder of the company?
 Yes
 No
Q15. Prior to becoming CEO, you were:
 Working at the same organization in a different position
 Working at a different organization
Q16. How long have you been CEO of your current company?
 Less than a year
 1-2
 2-5
 5-8
 8 or more
Q17. How would you describe the composition of your top management team (TMT) in
regards to their educational backgrounds?
Sliding Scale (1 to 4)
Q18. How would you describe the composition of your top management team (TMT) in
regards to their functional experiences (e.g., Finance, Operations, Accounting, HR)?
Sliding Scale (1 to 4)
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Q19. What was the ratio between your total compensation (salary, bonuses, equity, etc.) and
the total compensation of the second-highest-paid executive in your firm last year?
 Less than 1 (i.e., less than the total compensation of the second-highest-paid executive)
 1 (i.e., approximately the same total compensation)
 1.25 (i.e., approximately 25% more)
 1.5 (i.e., approximately 50% more)
 1.75 (i.e., approximately 75% more)
 2 (i.e., approximately 2 times more)
 3-5 (i.e., approximately 3 to 5 times more)
 5-10 (i.e., approximately 5 to 10 times more)
 >10 (i.e., more than 10 times)
Q20. Describe the importance of these different factors on your organization's success
Unimportant

Of Little
Importance

Moderately
Important

Important

Very Important

Firm's internal
capabilities
(e.g.,
knowledge,
patents,
technologies)











Leadership of
top
management
team











Macroeconomic
conditions (e.g.,
economy,
employment
levels, etc.)











Industry's
forces (e.g.,
rules and
regulations,
level of
competition,
etc.)











Performance
level of
employees











Insights from
board of
directors
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Q21. Are you currently serving as a board member or involved in a non-profit
organization?
 Yes
 No
Q22. Your name (Last, first):
Q23. Age:
 < 30
 30-34
 35-39
 40-44
 45-49
 50-54
 55-59
 60-64
 > 65
Q24. Organization Name:
Q25. Your email:
Q26. Would you like to receive a 2014 FIU Partner-in-Research Seal for your participation
in this study? You may display the seal on your company website, e-mails, or stationery.
 Yes, please email me a 2014 FIU Partner-in-Research Seal
 No
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